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Illegal logging is a serious issue that not only has dire environmental and social consequences, 
but also bring forwards the issue of poor governance of common pool resources. The purpose 
of this thesis is to contribute to understanding the causes of illegal logging. I integrated existing 
findings into one theoretical framework for rule compliance onto which I base my knowledge 
contribution.  Further, by building a system dynamics model on aggregate forest and 
policymaking dynamics, I ran simulations calibrated on historical data. Model simulations 
showed general fit-to-behavior with discrepancies for the logging function, pointing to the need 
to study how logging decisions are made. Because of this I designed a multiplayer online 
simulation game whose rules include an incentive, monitoring and sanctioning mechanism tied 
together in a scoring function. The participants in the pilot experiment played the game and 
then reflected about their experience in an interview. Through cross-referencing participant 
performance and their expressed rationale, I was able to derive initial insights on reasoning 
behind compliance with the allowable annual cut. Results showed that participants differed in 
motivation (competitive or noncompetitive) and strategy (compliant and noncompliant). 
Overall, participants with a compliant strategy expressed more reasons justifying their behavior 
compared to noncompliant participants. Illegal gain was most often used as a justification for 
noncompliant behavior, pointing to the incentive structure as a leverage point. Receiving news 
that another player has been sanctioned reinforced the participants original strategy, which 
highlights the role of social norms. These initial insights broaden scholarly understanding of 
compliance and set the stage for running a full-scale experiment. This thesis also has a 
methodological contribution as it outlines the process of developing a simulation game based 
off a system dynamics model for the specific purpose of research. Moreover, it proves the 
usefulness of pilot experiments for studying decision-making reasoning.  
 
Keywords: compliance, illegal logging, reasoning, public forest, system dynamics model, 
simulation game, pilot experiment  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background  
Ever since the publication of “Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardin, 1968), the public has 
realized that common-pool resources are prone to exploitation. The commons are rivalrous 
non-excludable resources, which means that it is not possible to prevent people from using 
them, yet they are exhaustive in the sense that there is less available for others when one user 
increases their use.  Public forests, or rather wood from public forests, is a common pool 
resource. This means that they are prone to exploitation that could ultimately lead to their 
destruction, i.e. a tragedy that could have been prevented. In the context of public forests, the 
tragedy refers to an insufficient level of wood in public forests leaving loggers unable to meet 
any demand. In addition to this, the tragedy also includes a variety of negative environmental 
effects like biodiversity loss and climate change (Lawrence & Vadencar, 2015).    
 
The latest issue of Forest Resources Assessment from the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations (2020a) showed that there are 4.06 billion hectares of forest remaining. 
The global trend has shown a persistent rate of net forest loss, ever since the publication of the 
first official global statistic about net loss from 1980 to 1990 (FAO, 1995), albeit the rate of 
loss has gradually been slowing down since then.  
 
The tragedy of the commons offers one plausible explanation for the reality of deteriorating 
forests. However, the tragedy of the commons is an example of an open access resource, i.e. a 
resource that is not owned by anyone and there are no relevant examples of socio-ecological 
systems that are truly open access. Even public meadows are de jure owned by national 
governments. Possible land tenures include private (state or individual), communal or some 
form of hybrid ownership structure. Most of the global forests are public, even though the 
percent of public forests has decreased to its current value of 73% (FAO, 2020a), which 
explains the focus on public forests in this thesis.   
 
Faced with the deteriorating state of global forests and the fact that they are under land tenure 
agreements, as opposed to open access, it is worthwhile to examine the factors leading to their 
detriment. Forest use is impacted by population pressure and market mechanisms. This has 
already been captured in existing system dynamics research in the context of other common 
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pool resources. A notable example is the Fishbanks simulator (Sterman, 2014), which describes 
the effect of market pressures on a fishing stock with no official owner. 
 
Following up on this, Moxnes (2000) has set a hypothesis regarding misperceptions of 
feedback, which analyzes the case of a resource with a single owner. This research posits that 
a significant reason for mismanagement may simply be cognitive inability to appreciate the 
feedback present in socio-ecological systems. Put simply, given the existence of a market 
mechanism users are unable to manage the resource, despite goodwill, because of faulty 
strategies that do not take into account bioeconomic complexities. Rather, their strategies are 
a better fit to simpler control systems, like the impulse to remove one’s hand from a hot stove 
in order not to get burned.  
 
However, both these examples fail to include governance as a mediator of the effect of 
population pressures and market mechanisms. In fact, institutional efficiency has come out as 
the best predictor for forest sustainability according to field research (Agrawal, 1997). In the 
words of Ruiz-Pérez, Franco-Múgica, González, Gómez-Baggethun & Alberruche-Rico 
(2011), the Fishbanks simulator is a representation of “a tragedy of open access”, as it only 
describes the effect of market pressures on a resource with no owner or governance regime. 
They were the only ones to run experiments with the Fishbanks simulator that accommodated 
institutions employing governing rules. Not surprisingly, they found that groups that formed 
institutions outperformed groups that did not.  
 
In light of this, data on global forests shows that about a half of the remaining forests have 
official management plans (2.05 billion hectares). Yet, despite this, many forests are 
unsustainably managed, as evidenced by long-running global forest net-loss rate, pointing the 
finger to poor governance, rather than the lack of an official management plan, as the cause for 
deforestation, specifically in the tropics (Fischer, Giessen & Günter, 2020) 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, I use the term governance as it was defined by the FAO: “the 
formal and informal rules, organizations and processes through which private and public actors 
articulate their interests” (2020b). In contrast to the concept of management, which addresses 
direct control over decisions, governance refers to a higher act of steering decisions. In the 
context of the commons, governance refers to the effect of the authority on individual 
decisions, while management refers to the effect of individual decisions on the resource.  
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On that end, it is worth exploring the causes of poor governance as well as defining what good 
governance is. For the purpose of this research, good governance is an equivalent of a regime 
that yields forest sustainability, i.e. a regime that establishes long-term resource non-
deterioration (Floyd, Vonhof & Seyfang, 2001).  As for the causes of poor governance, there 
is no panacea for governance of the commons. However, the causes of poor governance can be 
inspected in relation to the state of the resource and individual decision-making.  
 
I have created a conceptual model to explain the context in which I will conduct this research 
(see Figure 1). As previously defined, the commons refer to socio-ecological systems that are 
composed of three parts: (1) a resource, (2) formal or informal rules governing its use and (3) 
individual decisions regarding extraction levels. Take the example of a public forest. Its state 
serves to influence governance rules through a rule-formation process. Next, individuals, or 
groups of individuals, may choose to comply with the governance rules or not against their 
better judgement. Finally, individual decisions directly influence the state of the forest through 
extraction.   
 
 
Figure 1. A concept model of the commons (Source: Author’s representation). The circle denotes a physical variable, while 
boxes reflect non-physical variables. Similarly, the solid line stands for a physical process, while the dotted and dashed line 
are non-physical processes. 
 
Notwithstanding, this diagram is a simplified abstraction and not an attempt to portray reality 
as it is. It may, for example, very well be that the resource is affected through factors not present 
in the conceptual model. However, the concept model serves solely the purpose of narrowing 
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down the focus of this thesis to rule compliance. Based on this, rule compliance can be 
understood as the process through which governing rules influence individual decisions in the 
context of a certain resource state. One of the greatest contributors to the literature on 
governance rules for the commons is Ostrom (2005: 415), who identified seven broad types of 
rules as shown in Table 1.  
 
Together, rules of these classifications make up a governing policy for the commons, although 
they may not always be formal or explicit. Despite this rich reality of governance rules, I will 
focus solely on compliance as the effect of choice, information and payoff rules on individual 
decisions. And I will make simplified assumptions for all the other rules. Specifically, choice 
rules will be represented through a quota, information rules will be represented through 
information about the resource state and the behavior of others, payoff rules will be represented 
as a monitoring and sanctioning mechanism as well as a scoring mechanism. The details of this 
are elaborated in the following chapters. 
 
Rule type Description 
Position Rules that specify the power hierarchy in the governance structure  
Boundary Rules that define the circumstances under which there may be a change in positions of the 
power hierarchy 
Choice Rule regarding the types of decisions individuals can make and their obligations 
Aggregation Rules that describe how governing decisions ought to be made in the presence of multiple 
positions with partial control 
Information Rules that characterize the types of information in the commons and its availability 
Payoff Rules that set the external rewards or sanctions as well as the conditions under which they 
are receivable 
Scope Rules that limit the range of possible outcomes 
Table 1. Seven broad types of governance rules for the commons (based on Ostrom, 2005) 
 
1.2 Extent and significance of the problem   
When studying compliance, it is important to describe the extent of illegal behavior in public 
forests. INTERPOL (2019) estimates that up to 30% of global timber production is the result 
of illegal logging. The extent of illegal logging varies in different regions rising up to an 
estimated 90% of illegal logging in some tropical countries. The consequences of this can be 
staggering. There are economic costs on governments, who are being robbed off revenue, and 
on responsible loggers, whose income is lowered as a result of devaluation of the price of 
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timber (European Commission, 2020; Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, 
2020), estimated to be up to 16% depending on the type of wood product (WWF, 2020). 
Further, the environmental effects of increased deforestation due to illegal logging are 
contributing to global warming and biodiversity loss. Finally, illegal logging is also detrimental 
to local and indigenous communities and has been shown to lead to violent conflict (Conterras-
Hermosilla, 2002:16).  
 
From a scientific perspective, illegal logging has been linked to poor policy, corruption and 
rising demand (FAO, 2005:7). Sutinen & Kuperan (1999) posited that “there is little or no 
recognition of how policies and the policy process may affect the extent of compliance with 
regulations” and that “policy analysis and formulation frequently assume perfect compliance 
can be achieved at no cost”. Hence, research on understanding the causes of noncompliance is 
ongoing and its significance lies in the fact that studying compliance can inform deterrence 
policies, avoiding costly and counterproductive action.  
 
1.3 Objective  
To study reasoning behind rule compliance in public forests by analyzing the behavior and 
reflections of players in a simulation game1.   
 
1.4 Research questions 
RQ1: What relevant concepts and frameworks exist for explaining reasoning behind rule 
compliance in public forests? 
 
RQ2: What system dynamics structure can be used to build a simulation game that mimics a 
situation where individuals make decisions to either comply with the governing rules of public 
forests or not?  
 
RQ3: What initial insights can be derived about reasoning behind rule compliance from the 
pilot experiment?  
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1.5 Thesis structure  
The organization of the thesis is as follows. First, Chapter 2 is a literature review that answers 
RQ1 by identifying existing theory on rule compliance. Next, Chapter 3 describes the 
methodology used in this study, delineating the method of data collection and analysis. Chapter 
4 outlines the model while Chapter 5 describes the simulation game, which together answer 
RQ2. Next, the pilot experiment is described in Chapter 6, while its results are the subject of 
Chapter 7, answering RQ3. Finally, Chapter 8 presents an overview of the insights emerging 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical background 
The aim of this chapter is to summarize existing research on the causes, or reasons for, 
compliance, making sure to provide definitions for all relevant concepts. At the same time, this 
chapter sheds light on major issues and debates in this area of research. 
 
2.1 Overview 
Compliance has been formalized as socio-economic theory by Sutinen & Kuperan (1999: 183). 
Similarly, Raakjær Nielsen (2003: 431) has developed a framework for compliance in fisheries 
management and Ramcilovic-Suominen & Epstein (2012: 7) have developed a framework of 
forest law compliance. These three frameworks share many similarities, albeit they sometimes 
use different words. As a summary, they describe two types of motivation for compliance (see 
Figure 2): extrinsic motivation, which is instrumental and utilitarian in essence, and intrinsic 
motivation, which encapsulates normative and social-context dependent motivation.  
 
 
Figure 2. A theoretical framework for rule-compliance (Source: Author’s representation) 
 
2.2 Definitions 
Specifically, extrinsic motivation describes the process of decision-making as one by weighting 
costs and benefits, taking into account their probabilities. On the other hand, intrinsic 
motivation refers to contextual social norms, legitimacy and morals and values. This 
discernment between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, or between instrumental and normative 
reasons is mentioned both by Raakjær Nielsen (2003) and Epstein (2017). 
 
Within extrinsic motivation, compliance can be looked at as a calculation that takes into 
account: (1) the illegal gain, or the payoff for successfully getting away with illegal activities, 
(2) the penalty level, or the expected sanction for getting caught, and (3) the probability of 
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getting caught and sanctioned, which is the decision-maker’s perception of the monitoring and 
sanctioning mechanism including their attitude to risk.  These three pieces of information align 
with Expected Utility Theory. Hence, given information on these three concepts, a decision-
maker would make the rational choice that results in the largest payoff.  
 
Intrinsic motivation is characterized by: (1) the decision-maker’s personal moral norms and 
values, which represent their evaluation of what is a just decision, (2) social norms, which 
reflect the types of decisions that are common in the social environment, and (3) the legitimacy 
of the governing rule, i.e. the decision-maker’s perception regarding whether that rule is 
reasonable and fair in the social context.  
 
The integration of all these concepts into one theoretical framework implies that a change in 
any one of these concepts may influence a change in the decision-maker’s decision. In addition, 
they may all be used in the decision-making process or the decision might be based on only 
one of these concepts, which implies that these concepts are not mutually exclusive. However, 
it is considered that they are collectively exhaustive, which is to say that the framework is broad 
enough to integrate all known drivers of compliance.   
 
2.3 Summary of existing research 
Enforcement mechanisms like monitoring and sanctions are key for studying deterrence. 
Andersen and Stafford (2003) analyzed the relationship between sanctions and rule compliance 
and found that sanction severity, or the level of financial penalty, has a larger influence on rule 
compliance compared to probability of being sanctioned. In addition, past sanctions increased 
individual probability of rule noncompliance. This reinforcing behavior can be thought of as a 
norm where it becomes normal for individuals not to comply after they have been sanctioned 
once. In regard to the difference between endogenous and exogenous sanctioning mechanisms, 
Baldassarri & Grossman (2011) found that officially elected sanction executors resulted in 
higher contributions compared to randomly allocated sanction executors.  
 
However, the probability of detection and the size of the penalty are not alone in influencing 
compliance, research has shown that the perception of legitimacy matters too (Viteri & Chavez, 
2007), as processes in which a larger part of the population participates are seen as more 
legitimate. Similarly, Travers et al. (2011) conducted experiments with common pool resource 
games to study the level of cooperation within different institutional arrangements in 
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Cambodia. They found that treatments promoting self-organization had a significant positive 
effect on cooperation, i.e. on deterrence. In addition, Tyran & Feld (2006) find that mild law 
is more successful in ensuring rule compliance when it is endogenously chosen, i.e. self-
imposed. Additionally, study results from forestry (Agarwal, 2009) have shown that a higher 
proportion of women in a governing body contributed to a better state of the resource, which 
may be interpreted as more participation given the assumption that a more diverse governing 
body is more representative of the pool of resource users. 
 
Likewise, the idea that participation increases deterrence has also come up in a public good 
experiment (Kingsley and Brown, 2016). This is a powerful idea because it is much cheaper to 
involve groups in the rule formation process, than to invest in building capacity for rule 
enforcement. Translating this idea to public forests, it means that simply involving local 
communities in the governance process would significantly improve the state of many public 
forests. 
 
Notwithstanding, other factors mentioned in the theoretical framework have also come out as 
relevant in scholarly research. Specifically, Peterson & Diss-Torrance (2014) have found that 
moral norms are significant when the cost of compliance, i.e. illegal gain, is low. In addition, 
demographic factors and dependency on the resource for livelihood, i.e. illegal gain, have come 
out as explanatory factors (Madrigal-Ballestero, Schulter & Lopez, 2013). 
 
Coming back to the rule compliance framework (see Figure 2), Epstein (2017) disserts that 
there is a divide in the research community between more classically trained economists who 
favor extrinsic motivation and the rest of the social scientists who argue that intrinsic 
motivation is more important for explaining compliance behavior. Morgan, Mason & Shupp 
(2019) studied public goods and found that participation through comments had a positive 
effect on rule compliance only when accompanied by sanctions. This finding has also come 
out in the case of participation through voting, producing synergy between rule enforcement 
and participation in the rule formation process (DeCaro, Janssen & Lee, 2015). This was further 
confirmed in an experimental game with common pool resources. Rodriguez-Sickert, Guzmán 
& Cárdenas (2008) found that enforcement yielded compliance regardless of the social norm, 




- 18 - 
Both extrinsic and intrinsic motivation are important, and these results pinpoint their 
interconnectedness and co-dependency. While in the past it was more common to see 
policymakers use economic models of extrinsic motivators, intrinsic motivation factors are 
now gaining research attention not as a superior, but as equally important, thus proving that 
these two types of motivation are complimentary as showcased by Hatcher, Jaffry, Thebaud & 
Bennett (2000) in the case of fisheries. 
 
Last, just as there is no panacea regarding governance regimes so too there is no panacea 
regarding a set of mechanisms that promote rule compliance. This is clearly visible in the 
research of Ramcilovic-Suominen and Epstein (2015), who find inconsistencies in the factors 
affecting compliance in a forestry case study in Ghana. Rather than attempting to create the 
best explanatory framework for rule compliance, my research is a modest attempt to contribute 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a general overview of the methodology used in this 
thesis. Since, different methodologies were applied in each phase of the research, the model 
development and the game development phase are described within this chapter. While, 
Chapter 6 is dedicated to describing the pilot experiment phase.  
 
I used a mixed-methods approach during this research. Broadly, the research consisted of three 
phases:  
(1) Model development phase 
(2) Game development phase 
(3) Pilot experiment phase 
 
3.1 Model development phase 
I used system dynamics for developing a model that describes a public forest use system. As 
such, the model described the interaction between the public forest, the governance policy in 
place and logging decisions. My rationale for choosing system dynamics as a method is 
because it is well suited to building aggregate models that capture dynamics arising from 
delays, nonlinearities and feedback, all of which are present in public forest use systems.   
 
The modeling process loosely followed the steps outlined by Sterman (2000: 83). Specifically, 
I first established a model boundary, after which I developed a dynamic hypothesis in the form 
of model structure based on literature and official government documents. I iteratively 
modified the model structure as I calibrated the variables by partial model testing for calibration 
(Homer, 2012) using two datasets. I established model quality through comparison with 
historical data, extreme conditions testing, structure confirmation testing and behavior 
sensitivity analysis (Barlas, 1996). Apart from comparing with real-world data, I analyzed 
model behavior with the help of feedback analysis. Refer to Chapter 4 for a complete 
explanation.  
 
3.2 Game development phase 
Interactive simulators have been used to estimate decision rules within system dynamics 
research since the 1980s (Arango Aramburo, Castañeda Acevedo & Olaya Morales, 2012). 
However, the present study utilizes gaming, which differs from a traditional simulator because 
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it includes game-like characteristics (van Daalen, Schaffernicht & Mayer, 2014) such as an 
imaginary context, characters, rules, goals etc. Moreover, it falls within the narrow area of 
using system dynamics gaming for experimental research (e.g. Moxnes, 2000) rather than for 
learning (e.g. Kopainsky & Sawicka 2010). Experimental games, which are not based on 
system dynamics models, have been widely used to study human behavior within the context 
of commons problems and contribute to building a multi-method understanding of the issue 
(Poteete, Janssen & Ostrom, 2009: 257). Thus, the rationale behind choosing gaming as a 
research method rests on the fact that system dynamics and gaming are a good fit, while gaming 
is a proven strategy for studying commons problems.  
 
I developed the game with the help of a game design framework from Bots & van Daalen 
(2007), which informed my game design choices. In particular, I modified the model to include 
game-like characteristics, effectively building an incentive structure that facilitates a game 
experience. Moreover, I created an interactive interface with a specific theme and characters, 
which further add game-like character. Game calibration was based historical data, while the 
rest of the game design process was the result of my own creativity.  
 
In order to study the usability of the game, I conducted game testing parallel during the entire 
game development process. Further, I analyzed the possible range of game behavior using 
model simulation. The full results of the game development process are visible in Chapter 5. 
However, the extent of analysis I could independently conduct on the game was limited. For 
this reason, I ran a pilot experiment, described in Chapter 6, which allowed me to analyze how 
real players interact with the game and consequently draw insights regarding rule compliance 
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Chapter 4: Model 
This chapter, along with Chapter 5, answers RQ2. Specifically, Chapter 4 describes and 
critically analyzes the behavior of a system dynamics model that can be used to build a 
simulation game, which is detailed in Chapter 5. 
 
4.1 Overview 
The model is an aggregate representation of a resource use system, specifically a system of 
forest use for wood. Thus, its value lies in its holism as it integrates both the biological and 
social aspects of this system. Figure 3 gives the full structure of the model and highlights parts 
of the structure according to the elements of the conceptual model (see Figure 1). These are the 
forest structure (highlighted in green), which corresponds to resource state; the governance 
structure (highlighted in yellow), which corresponds to governance rules; and the management 
structure (highlighted in blue), which corresponds to individual decision-making.  
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4.2 Structure description  
The source material for building the model included a textbook on modeling forest growth and 
yield (Vanclay, 1994: 14), a textbook on system dynamics modeling (Sterman, 2000: 503) and 
government documents from the Government of British Columbia (2017, 2019, 2020). This 
data source was chosen in particular because Canada, and specifically British Columbia, had 
the most publicly available data on the forest governance process that was accessible to me at 
the time of writing. This section merely describes the structure, while elaborate details on the 
source material can be found in section 4.10.1. Additionally, the full model documentation can 
be found Appendix 1.  
 
4.2.1 Forest structure 
The forest is represented through a co-flow structure that describes the relationship between 
the amount of forested land (Forested area) and total volume of wood (Growing stock) in the 
forest. Namely, the forest undergoes logistic growth, which is limited by the physical space 
(Maximum forest area). So that, the state of the forest compared to its maximum size (Forest 
cover) affects natural expansion of the forest, together with an exogenously set reference 
growth rate (Reference natural expansion rate). Natural expansion is represented as an increase 
in volume of wood in the forest (Growing stock increment). The growth of new wood brings 
about an increase in forested land (Regeneration) through an exogenous average variable 
(Marginal hectare per growing stock increment), highlighting the principle that area grows as 
a result of growth in volume. Finally, the amount of wood decreases through logging (Wood 
removal), which corresponds to a decrease in forested area (Deforestation), according to the 
current average forest density (Forest area per growing stock). 
 
4.2.2 Governance structure 
The objective of the government is to maintain the forest in equilibrium, i.e. to only allow as 
much logging as there is estimated new growth in the forest. Hence, the governing policy 
(Allowable annual cut) is endogenously determined by comparing the current growth level of 
the forest (Growing stock increment) with the past policy objective in place (Desired allowable 
annual cut). The difference between these two is updated along a set timeframe so that the 
estimated growth level can be reached during that time (Desired allowable annual cut 
adjustment time). Finally, the objective (Desired allowable annual cut) is put into official 
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4.2.3 Management structure 
The management structure is centered around logging (Wood removal). As defined in Chapter 
2, the term ‘management’ refers to decision-making that directly affects the state of the 
resource as opposed to ‘governance’, which refers to decision-making that indirectly affects 
the state of the resource. In the model, it is assumed that the quota (Annual allowable cut) is 
logged up to total Growing stock depletion.  
 
4.3 Purpose and time horizon 
The purpose of the model is to serve as a base for developing a simulation game which can be 
used for studying reasoning behind rule compliance in public forests. With this specific purpose 
in mind, the model has been constructed to be representative of a hypothetical public forest use 
system, that is analogous to real-world public forest systems. Hence, the model structure is 
very aggregated in order to keep the model as simple as possible, while at the same time it is 
as representative of real-world systems as possible. The trade-off between these two 
requirements has resulted in the above-described structure.  
 
A long time-horizon of 50 years has been chosen given that the focus of the model is to capture 
the relationship between the forest, policy and wood removal decisions. Specifically, the forest 
and policymaking are subject to slow-moving dynamics, i.e. it takes years before a visible 
change takes place. Within the model, the long delay time of Desirable allowable annual cut 
adjustment time and the low values of Marginal hectare per growing stock increment and 
Reference growth rate stand as witnesses of this.  
 
4.4 Boundary 
A boundary can be identified with the purpose of the model in mind. The main purpose of this 
model is to serve as a base for the development of a simulation game that can aid in researching 
rule compliance in public forests (RQ2). Given this purpose and the time available for this 
research project, an aggregate hypothetical model of forest use has been created.  
 
Notably, many parts of reality have been omitted. For example, the governance process of 
determining the quota is within the boundary of the model, but the process of appropriating the 
quota to legal bodies on the basis of ownership structures (land tenure) is outside the boundary 
of this model. A full representation of model boundary can be seen in the Bull’s eye diagram 
(see Figure 4). A Bull’s eye diagram is a useful structure described by Ford (97:1990) that 
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helps illustrate which variables are at the core of the model (endogenous), which are set through 
external assumptions or data (exogenous) and which are not considered relevant for the purpose 
of the model (excluded). System dynamics is specifically well-suited to studying the dynamics 
created through interconnected endogenous variables.  
 
 
Figure 4. Bull's eye diagram for depicting model boundary 
 
4.5 Assumptions 
Many assumptions have been made for the sake of maintaining model simplicity. This means 
that the model has an aggregate structure that does not aim to realistically represent any real-
world system, but rather to serve as a virtual laboratory (de Gooyert, 2018) so that different 
experiments can be made with the case of a hypothetical forest.     
 
1) Homogeneity. The model assumes a homogenous forest, where each tree is presumably 
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all trees in the system are considered to have the same age and the same yield in terms 
of wood.  
 
2) No competition for the landscape. The model does not take into account any limits to 
growth apart from landscape capacity.  
 
3) Unchanging external conditions. External conditions such as soil quality, pollution, 
water availability, natural hazards or the weather are considered static or perfect. 
Similarly, economic development or other factors affecting demand are not taken into 
account. 
 
4) No differentiation between wood removal strategies. In reality many different 
silvicultural practices exist that dictate the exact trees and the manner in which they 
will be cut so as to limit the impact of logging on forest area. The model assumes a 
highly simplistic wood removal function that does not distinguish between the effect of 
different wood removal strategies on deforestation. Rather it models the average effect 
based upon the average forest area per growing stock.  
 
5) No afforestation or reforestation. The concepts of anthropogenic forest plantation is 
outside model boundary because a report by the FAO that estimated that 90% of 
regeneration occurs through natural expansion (FAO 2010).  
 
6) Public forest. The forest is considered to be public and thus wholly under the reign of 
the government.  
 
7) No corruption or political influence. It is assumed that there are no bribes or similar 
political influence in the process of determining the allowable annual cut.  
 
8) Fixed Allowable annual cut for 10 years. It is assumed that the allowable annual cut is 
changed every 10 years, not more, not less.  
 
9)  Equal appropriation of Allowable annual cut. While in reality, the allowable annual 
cut is appropriated among different entities, the model assumes only one entity that 
does the logging. Thus, the effect of differences in allowable annual cut appropriation 
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are not taken into account. This assumption will be changed during the design of the 
simulation game.  
 
10)  No limit in wood removal capacity. It is assumed that logging is completed if there is 
enough growing stock, no matter the size of demand or allowable annual cut. 
 
11)  Compliance. The model assumes that the allowable annual cut is always respected over 
demand. This assumption will be changed during the design of the simulation game.  
 
12)  The forest grows most quickly at 50% forest cover. In reality, it need not be that the 
growing stock increment is largest at 50% forest cover. This is different for every forest, 
but it serves as a useful assumption for our hypothetical model. 
 
13)  Perfect information. The information used for policy objective formulation does not 
suffer any error or bias. In reality this measurement is continually updated, with new 
insights driving changes in policy decisions. The reasoning behind this assumption is 
the fact that the aim of the study is to study compliance of government policy, rather 
than policy formulation. This assumption allows us to control for the effect of policy 
formulation on compliance, and subsequently on the sustainability of the forest.    
 
4.6 Equilibrium condition 
The following conditions apply to set the model in equilibrium:    
 






Allowable	annual	cut	(0) = Desired	allowable	annual	cut	(0) = 	
Forest	area	(0)
2 × Reference	growth	rate 
 
4.7 Calibration  
The values for Forest area (0), Growing stock (0) and Allowable annual cut (0) have been 
calibrated according to two time-series datasets: one on global forests from the FAO (2009a, 
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2010) and one forests in Canada from the Canadian government (National Forestry Database, 
2020a, 2020b; FAO, 2014; World Bank, 2020a, 2020b).  
 
Marginal hectare per growing stock increment (0.0047-0.0053) and Reference growth rate 
(0.95 – 1.05) were calibrated using partial model testing for calibration (Homer, 2012). 
Specifically, their values were established by running the model with time-series data from the 
FAO and then searching for the range of values that showed best fit-to-data. The same 
procedure was undertaken with a different dataset from Canada’s government (National 
Forestry Database, 2020a, 2020b; FAO, 2014; World Bank 2020a, 2020b) and proved 
consistent results. 
	
Maximum forest area has been calibrated using partial model testing for calibration with the 
aim of getting the model to reproduce behavior that matches data for Net forest conversion 
(FAO, 2010) matches model behavior. Additionally, when working with the dataset from 
Canada, it has been calibrated by comparing model behavior to data for forest cover.  
 
Desired allowable annual cut (0) has been calibrated to equal Allowable annual cut (0) at the 
time of the start of the simulation. This implies synchronization between the policy objective 
and the official policy at the start of the simulation.  
 
Policy adjustment time (50 years), i.e. the timeframe to reach the policy objective was 
calibrated according to an analysis report of the Cascadia Timber Supply Zone (Government 
of British Columbia, 2019: 2). Further, partial testing for calibration confirmed that this value 
exhibits best fit-to-data.  
 
4.8 Feedback analysis 
Feedback analysis is a method of describing the circular causal connections in the model, which 
are called feedback loops and are useful for explaining model behavior. The stock-and-flow 
diagram (see Figure 3) has been translated into a causal loop diagram (see Figure 5) for the 
purpose of clearly presenting the loops in the model.   
 
R1 – Forest growth 
When there is an increase in the forest area, then the growing stock increment increases too. 
Next, an increase in the growing stock increment drives an increase in regeneration only to 
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increase the forest area even further. These variables represent the growth of the forest area in 
the form of a reinforcing loop, which may either drive forest growth or forest decline depending 
on the conditions.   
 
B1 – Limits to growth  
On the other hand, an increase in forest area also increases the forest cover, which then lowers 
the fractional growth rate. In turn, this decreases the growing stock increment and subsequently 
decreases regeneration to ultimately decrease forest area. Together, these variables and their 
relations amount to a balancing loop that describes the natural limit of the forest. Namely, the 
forest can only grow up to its maximum size, and its growth slows down as it approaches this 
limit.  
 
R2 and R3 – Wood removal increases forest growth 
As explained before, an increase in forest area increases the forest cover and decreases the 
fractional growth rate. Further, this decreases the growing stock increment and thus the desired 
and actual allowable annual cut. This decrease of the allowable annual cut drives a decrease in 
wood removal and deforestation before finally decreasing the forest area even further. 
Alternatively, in loop R3, a decrease in the growing stock increment decreases the growing 
stock, which decreases wood removal and deforestation before reinforcing the increase in 
forest area. This reinforcing loop describes the effect of the allowable annual cut on the 
fractional growth rate. Wood removal, facilitated through the allowable annual quota, reinforce 
growth behavior in cases when the forest cover is past the mid-point level and the fractional 
growth is slowing down. However, it can also drive reinforcing forest decline if the variables 
go in the opposite direction.  
 
B2 and B3 – Wood removal regulation 
Last, an increase in forest area increases the growing stock increment, which then increases the 
desired allowable annual cut and allowable annual cut correspondingly. This increase of the 
allowable annual cut drives an increase in wood removal and deforestation before finally 
decreasing the forest area. Alternatively, in B3, an increase in the growing stock increment 
increases the growing stock and wood removal. This subsequently drives deforestation and 
decreases the forest area. In simpler terms, this balancing loop describes the way the negative 
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Figure 5. The model as a causal loop diagram. Note that some variables and minor loops have been omitted for presentation 
purposes. 
 
4.9 Behavior description 
The model was simulated using Stella Architect software, version 1.9.5. Three model runs were 
done using the following specifications: 
• Time unit: Year 
• Time step (DT): 1  
• Time horizon: 1990 -2040 
• Integration Method: Euler 
 
4.9.1 Equilibrium run  
The equilibrium run was calibrated according to the equilibrium condition in section 4.6. The 
resulting behavior can be described as a dynamic equilibrium of all stocks where a forest area 
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balancing loops in the model. The equilibrium run serves as a base for conducting model 
structure tests.  
 
 
Figure 6. Equilibrium run 
 
4.9.2 Global run 
The simulation of the global run aims to recreate the use of forests on a global level with initial 
data calibration from the FAO (2009a, 2010). The behavior of the model can be compared with 
the reference mode, which is represented with data from 1990 to 2017.   
 
One can see that the state of global forests is in decline, with decreasing forest area and growing 
stock. Further, the forest is becoming denser as the forest area is declining faster than the 
growing stock. This is due to wood removal strategies, which focus on preserving growing 
stock rather than forest area. Despite being in decline, the rate of decline is gradually slowing 
down, most visible in Wood removal, which is representative of goal-seeking behavior. This 
indicates the dominance of balancing loops (B2 and B3) which slowly stabilize the system by 
adjusting Wood removal to come to equal Growing stock increment.  
 
The model seems to recreate this behavior well, as seen in Figure 7. However, there are some 
discrepancies between model behavior and the data for net forest conversion and Wood 
removal. Namely, the model exhibits lower values for net forest conversion than the data and 
lower values for Wood removal. This, in turn, implies that the difference between regeneration 
and deforestation is larger than the model represents. Given that there is no data on 
regeneration, we can only rely on data for afforestation and reforestation. We can see that the 
model exhibits a higher value of regeneration than the data for afforestation and reforestation, 
but not nearly high enough to match the observation that 90% of forest area expansion is 
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Marginal hectare per growing stock increment is calibrated with a value that is too low, or it 
might indicate an inconsistency in the data source.  
 
Next, there are two datasets on wood removal from the FAO (2009, 2010) where one is on 
average 15% lower than the other due to difference in data collection. The model does not do 
a good job at re-creating the behavior. In fact, the model shows decreasing Wood removal 
whereas the data shows increasing wood removal from 2000 onwards. This is not surprising 
given the simplistic assumption that there is an annual allowable cut governing the forest and 
that it is complied with. Hence, this behavior further motivates the creation of a simulation 




Figure 7. Global run 
 
4.9.3 Canada run  
The Canada simulation run is an effort to recreate the dynamics of forest use in Canada as 
compared to data up to 2017 (National Forestry Database, 2020a, 2020b; FAO, 2014; World 
Bank, 2020a, 2020b). The run is initially calibrated with data from 1990.  
 
Contrary to the global picture, the forest area in Canada has remained quite stable over the last 
30 years. The model captures this reality (see Figure 8), although it shows a slight decrease, 
which is due to discrepancy in Wood removal behavior. The same can be said for the behavior 
of forest cover, which is stable at 38% of land area. Disregarding the mismatch between model 











































































































- 32 - 
global run. Namely, the model exhibits goal seeking behavior, clearly evidenced in a declining 
wood removal rate, indicating dominance of the wood removal regulation balancing loops (B2 
and B3). The difference between the global run and this run, in terms of model dynamics, is 
only that this run is closer to equilibrium. 
 
Further, the model manages to recreate the declining trend in allowable annual cut which is 
visible in the data. However, it overstates Wood removal. This is understandable since the 
model assumes that all of the allowable annual cut is removed, whereas the data shows a 
significantly lower portion of the allowable annual cut being removed. This is consistent within 
more local data of the province British Columbia (Environmental Reporting BC, 2018), which 
also shows wood removal rates that are lower than the allowable annual cut. Naturally, this 
translated into a discrepancy between deforestation behavior in the model and corresponding 
data. Again, this behavior mismatch warrants further study on the link between the Allowable 




Figure 8. Canada run 
 
4.10 Model quality testing 
Model quality testing is an important part of any system dynamics project because it helps 
communicate the ways in which the model is or is not representative of the real-world system. 
Certainly, no model is a correct representation of the real world, and thus “all models are 
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researcher can take to establish the quality of the model as a tool for studying reality and 
drawing conclusions about reality.   
 
First of all, it is important to address the purpose of the model in order to understand what type 
of testing would be most suitable to establish the quality of the model. Barlas (1996) 
distinguishes between two types of models: black-box, or models driven by data, and white-
box, or theory-like, models. The present model falls somewhere in between these two broad 
categories. It is a classic system dynamics model in the sense that it attempts to not only 
produce behavior, but also explain how that behavior is produced, which is typical of ‘white-
box’ models. However, within the scope of this study, its purpose is merely to serve as a base 
for creating a simulation game which can be used to research rule-compliance in public forests, 
which is exemplary of ‘black-box’ models, which are more focused on behavior prediction. 
Thus, this unique purpose asks for both structure and behavior tests, however more emphasis 
is put on behavior tests because of the similarity to black-box models.  
 
According to Barlas (1996), the purpose of structure tests is to compare model structure with 
knowledge of the real-world system. With the structure confirmation test in particular, the 
model relations can be compared to datasets and literature that describe forest use. Next, the 
parameter confirmation test checks to see whether the parameters in the model are 
representative of the real-world both in their formulation and their calibration. Then, the 
extreme conditions test and behavior sensitivity analysis help establish structure robustness by 
comparing model behavior to expected model behavior.  
 
4.10.1 Structure confirmation test 
The forest is modeled to undergo logistic growth, limited by a carrying capacity described by 
the maximum forest size. This is typical of ecological models, including those of forests 
(Vanclay, 1994: 107). In addition, the relation between the forest area and growing stock is 
modeled using a generic co-flow system dynamics structure (Sterman, 2000: 503). The extent 
to which a co-flow structure is an appropriate representation of the relationship between forest 
area and growing stock is supported by the physical relationship between volume, of which 
growing stock is an expression, and area, indicated in the formula for calculating volume. Such 
a relationship necessitates a correlation between forest area and growing stock at the very least. 
In conclusion, while the structure does not do justice to the complex reality of a forest, it 
captures the most important aggregate links found in forest systems.  
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Next, the governance structure was built using data on British Columbia’s governance process. 
In particular, British Columbia has divided its governance into smaller governing units called 
Timber Supply Areas (TSA), which are under the responsibility of the country’s chief forester. 
The role of the chief forester is to determine the Allowable annual cut (AAC) for each Timer 
Supply Area at least every 10 years. This entire process is called the Timber Supply Review. 
Once the forester has made their decision, the Minister of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource 
Operations allocates the AAC to general types of forest licenses, yielding individual quotas. 
Thus, the full process is composed of two-stages: AAC determination, which is executed by 
the chief forester, and AAC appropriation, which is executed by the Minister of Forests, Lands 
and Natural Resource Operations (Government of British Columbia, 2017). 
 
Specifically, the Timber Supply Review (or AAC determination) is of interest to this thesis 
(see Figure 9). Documents from the government show that it undergoes three stages. First a 
data package regarding the TSA is released, followed by consultation and review from the 
public. Next, an analysis report is released detailing the specifics of a base run from a model 
simulation on the TSA, which is again followed by a consultation with the public. Finally, the 
Chief Forrester makes a decision regarding the AAC for that TSA and publishes an official 
rationale for that specific decision. 
 
 
Figure 9. British Columbia's Allowable annual cut determination process (based on Government of British Columbia, 2017). 
 
Looking at an example from a rationale of AAC Determination of TSA Cascadia, the objective 
is described to be “… to provide a harvest schedule that projects an orderly transition from the 
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British Columbia, 2020: 7). This is in-line with the model structure, which aims to maintain a 
dynamic equilibrium (even-flow), while allowing the highest possible wood removal (harvest 
level).  
 
The same information can be seen in the analysis report published prior to the decision 
(Government of British Columbia, 2019:29) where the model simulation shows gradual 
decreases in the AAC until an even-flow is reached in 50 years, which corresponds to the goal-
seeking structure of Desired allowable annual cut.    
 
Moreover, the governance structure shares similarities with the Gehrhardt Method (FAO, 
1998), which is a method for determining the allowable annual cut. As such is given as an 
official guideline for forest management planning. Specifically, the Gehrhardt Method rests on 
estimating the values of growing stock and growing stock increment of a theoretically normal 
forest. The allowable annual cut is then determined as the sum between (1) the average of the 
current growing stock increment and the theoretically normal growing stock increment and (2) 
the gap between the current growing stock and the theoretically normal growing stock over an 
adjustment time. Although different, this formulation is goal-seeking, just like the governance 
structure in the model. The main difference between the two is that the Gehrhardt Method is 
based off an estimation of a theoretically normal forest, whereas the present model structure is 
based on an initial value of Desired allowable annual cut. Hence, it can be argued that both 
formulations aim to close a gap between the current state of the forest and the desired state of 
the forest in a given adjustment time. In that sense, the calibration of Desired allowable annual 
cut is very important as it encapsulates the estimation for a theoretically normal forest. 
However, even though this is legitimate way of describing forest governance, it would be 
incorrect to assume that this structure is representative of global forests, especially given that 
only half of the remaining forests have official management plans (FAO, 2020a).   
 
In conclusion, it would be far fetching to claim that the governance structure is representative 
of all global governance systems. This is largely due to the fact that there is a huge variety of 
governance systems and attempts to aggregate them in a simple structure has yet to be 
successful. However, the model is representative of at least one specific governance situation 
regarding TSA Cascadia in British Columbia, and with that we can consider that it is 
representative of at least one case study, which can be indicative of more general propositions 
(Flyvbjerg, 2001:66) and is enough for the aim of this study.  
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Last, the management structure, or the link from Annual allowable cut to Wood removal does 
not have any backing in literature and thus fails to pass the structure conformation test. In fact, 
the data from Canada (National Forestry Database, 2020a) shows that wood removal is never 
exactly equal to the allowable annual cut, rather it is either above or below it. Further, illegal 
logging is not represented through this formulation. This is why the link is denoted with a 
dotted line representing a ‘wishful thinking’ link. Finally, this link is broken up in the design 
of the simulation game (see Chapter 5), as it is the exact data point that will be studied for the 
purpose of answering RQ3. 
 
4.10.2 Parameters confirmation test   
The names of the variables in the forest structure have been chosen to correspond to the terms 
used by the FAO. While those from the governance structure have been formulated based on 
terms used by the Government of British Columbia. Notably, this does not mean that every 
parameter represents something tangible in reality. But it can be established that the parameters 
establish concepts known and used in society, for most there is even data. Further, while the 
calibration of some parameters, such as the Desired allowable annual cut adjustment time have 
been based on specific case-study data, most others underwent partial model testing for 
calibration with comparisons across two datasets, as explained in 4.7.  
 
4.10.3 Extreme conditions test 
The following tests were run from a position of equilibrium (see section 4.9.1). All the values 
were increased and decreased by 20% as an extreme condition. See Table 2 for a summary of 
all the tests. In conclusion, the model is exhibiting plausible reactions to the shocks, therefore 
it has passed the extreme conditions test. 
 
Variable Value Expected behavior Simulated behavior Takeaway 
Wood removal +STEP (60, 
2000) 
Forest decline, delayed 
decrease in AAC 
Forest decline, 
extremely slow 
decrease in AAC. 
Forest behavior as 
expected. AAC is 
less sensitive than 
anticipated. -STEP (60, 
2000) 
Forest growth, delayed 
decrease in AAC 
Forest growth, 
extremely slow 






Forest growth, delayed 
decrease in AAC 
Decline in growing 
stock and AAC. 
The shock affected 
only the stock of 
forest area, which 
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growing stock 
increment 
Increase in forest 
area. 
ultimately had the 
opposite effect on 
growing stock 





Forest decline, delayed 
decrease in AAC 
Decline in forest area 






Forest growth, delayed 
decrease in AAC 
Forest growth and 
increase in AAC. 
The shock changed 
the range of 
growing stock 
increment and thus 
it also changed the 
range of AAC. 
-STEP (0.8, 
2000) 
Forest decline, delayed 
decrease in AAC 
Forest decline and 





Forest growth, delayed 
increase in AAC 
Forest growth and 
increase in AAC. 
The shock affected 
forest cover and 
thus AAC. -STEP (240, 
2000) 
Forest decline, delayed 
decrease in AAC 
Forest decline and 












No change No change 
Table 2. Extreme condition tests 
 
4.10.4 Behavior sensitivity analysis 
I ran behavior sensitivity tests in order to investigate the relationship between model structure 
and model behavior. This helped me identify sensitive parameters and understand the role of 
the different feedback loops in the model. Starting from a position of equilibrium, I varied all 
exogenous variables from +20% to -20% of their equilibrium value. Out of all exogenous 
variables, the following proved sensitive: Reference growth rate, Maximum forest area and 
Desired allowable annual cut (0).    
 
Model sensitivity appears whenever the system is pushed out of equilibrium. In fact, all model 
reactions can be understood as tendencies of the model to bring itself back into a state of 
equilibrium. Thus, the conclusion from this sensitivity analysis is that the model is robust and 
highly dominated by balancing loops B2 and B3. See the full description of the sensitivity 
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4.10.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion the tests have confirmed that model behavior is robust under a fairly broad range 
of parameter values. This confirms the validity of model structure. However, model simulation 
runs have not been able to sufficiently explain historical data on Wood removal. This is 
indicative of the fact that the present formulation of Wood removal is not representative and to 
the general lack of understanding of the drivers of wood removal. Thus, model quality testing 
has demonstrated the need to develop a simulation game and direct experiment in order to elicit 
behavioral decision-making data (Sterman, 1987).  
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Chapter 5: Simulation game 
 
5.1 Overview 
A simulation game was created based on the model described in Chapter 4. It was designed for 
the purpose of gathering data for RQ3, which is to study reasoning behind rule compliance in 
public forests. Further, this purpose guided other design choices, as outlined in Table 3, which 
are elaborated on in this chapter. 
  
Game property Design choice 
Purpose To gather research data on rule compliance in public forests 
Insights obtained The researcher can obtain insights on reasoning behind rule compliance by 
analyzing post-game interview data. 
Plot A public forest is managed by the government through the allocation of a set 
quota for logging companies. However, the quota is not always in line with 
the demand experienced by logging companies, creating an incentive for the 
companies to log illegally and get greater rewards. Further, illegal logging is 
a risky activity because there is an unknown probability that the company 
might get caught and sanctioned by the government.   
Players Laypeople without direct experience in forest use 
Roles Logging companies (actual players) and the government (played by the 
model) 
Rules Players make decisions about how much they will log each round. No 
communication is possible between players.  
Representation of physical 
system 
The forest is represented virtually, so that the players see a delayed 
information about the forest cover, i.e. the amount of total land covered by 
forest, in every round. 
Representation of inter-actor 
environment 
Each round the players receive news if any one of the other players has been 
sanctioned for illegal logging or if they themselves have passed inspection or 
have been sanctioned by the government.  
Table 3. Game design choices based on Bots & van Daalen (2007) 
 
5. 2 Modification of the model   
In order to convert the model into a game, the wishful thinking link between Allowable annual 
cut and Wood removal was broken up. Instead, players of the game are asked to set the value 
for Wood removal each round. In this way, loops R2 and B2 are broken up (see Figure 5), 
turning wood removal from an endogenous variable into an exogenous variable. The main 
differences between the model and the game (see Table 4) encompass the timelines, which are 
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elaborated on in section 5.3, and the equation for wood removal. While the model assumed 
wood removal to be equal to the allowable annual cut, the game allows wood removal to be 
either below or above the annual cut, according to player decision-making. 
 
Characteristic Model Game 
Time horizon 50 years 40 years 
Time step 1 year 1 year 
Decision making interval N/A 3 years 
Wood removal formulation Equals allowable annual cut Summation of individual decisions 
Table 4. Differences between model and game 
 
In addition to these main differences, three new sectors were added to the model for the purpose 
of making the game more realistic: incentive, monitoring, sanctioning and scoring (see Figure 
10).  
 
5.2.1 Incentive structure 
As part of the incentive, a player has to decide between logging the full demand or abiding by 
the government policy described by the allowable annual cut. Specifically, demand (Demand) 
is set to grow (Increase in demand) exponentially according to an external growth factor 
(Fractional demand growth rate). This conceptualization is based off the exponential growth 
of the logging industry (FAO, 2009b). The allowable annual cut (Allowable annual cut) is 
equally divided among players into individual quotas (Individual quota) and is bound to 
decline, as shown in Chapter 4. Each player sets their preferred logging level (Extraction level) 
which becomes the actual logging level (Wood removal) as long as there is growing stock from 
the forest left. This specific formulation of the incentive structure depicts an increasing gap 
between demand and the legal quota. The justification behind this formulation is that high 
demand has been identified as one of the root causes for illegal activities in the forest sector 
(FAO, 2005:7).  
 
5.2.2 Monitoring and sanctioning structure 
I added a sanctioning and monitoring mechanism in order for the game to be representative of 
a public forest with a quota enforcement system and in order to capture the effect of probability 
of getting sanctioned, which was identified as one of the listed reasons for compliance in the 
theoretical framework (see Figure 2). Monitoring is based on a uniform probability distribution 
(Uniform probability distribution) that generates a random sequence of monitoring events with 
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a frequentist probability of 50%2 (Probability of being monitored). From there, if a player is 
monitored (Is monitored) and found to log more than the individual quota, then they are 
sanctioned (Sanctions in process), leading to an increase in the total number of sanctions 
(Cumulative sanctions). In particular, the sanction consists of total retrieval of inventory by the 
government, thus preventing the player from satisfying any demand in that round (Increase in 
losses from sanctions), adding to the total experienced loss from sanctions (Cumulative losses 
from sanctions). The game also notifies players when one of their remaining players has been 
sanctioned, which captures an element of social norms, also found as a common reason for 
compliance (see Chapter 2). The full formulation of this can be seen in the game equations 
(See Appendix 3).  
 
 
Figure 10. Game structure 
 
5.2.3 Scoring structure 
Further, each unit of satisfied customer demand is worth 1 point, while each unit of unsatisfied 
customer demand is worth -1 point (Points converter). There are no extra points for logging 
more than the demand. The points are calculated each round (Change of score) and added up 
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to the total score (Cumulative score). This formulation depicts a reality of market pressures 
and opportunity costs, and at the same time it captures illegal gain and penalty level, which 
were mentioned as one of the main reasons behind compliance in the theoretical framework 
(see Figure 2).  
 
Most of the variables are arrayed by player, which is to say that they hold and compute different 
values for each player. In addition, a number of game control variables have been added in 
order to create the interface, which are documented in the Appendix 3. Last, no specific 
structure or interface function has been added to stimulate reasoning stemming from moral and 
values or legitimacy because these are considered to be internalized perceptions.  
 
5.3 Simulation timelines 
There are two timelines running throughout the game. First, time proceeds as it did in the model 
described in Chapter 4 from 1980 to 2020 using the Euler integration method with a time step 
of 1 year. However, the additional sectors in the model have a timestep of 3 years starting with 
1984. This is because of the decision-making intervals in the game, which take place every 
three years starting with 1980 up to 2016, resulting in a total of 13 rounds. The justification 
behind two timelines was in order to capture a longer time-horizon for model simulation (see 
reasons for this in section 4.3), while at the same time maintaining a short duration of game 
play of only 13 rounds, which is more user-friendly. For the players themselves, this means 
that although they make decisions for how one logging level every three years, they have 
effectively logged 3 times their stated logging level out of the forest before they have to make 
their decision again. This is representative of the real-world where management decisions are 
made periodically, while logging is continuous.  
 
5.4 Players 
Table 1 discussed two roles in the game: the government and logging companies. The game is 
designed to be played with 3 players who each represent a logging company (see Figure 11), 
while the role of the government is simulated by the model as described in Chapter 4. The 
logging companies were branded as birds mainly because of the neutral image of birds, in terms 
of gender and other identifiers, so that it would not influence the choices made by players given 
the research purpose of this game. A minimum of 2 players are required, Treecreeper and 
Nuthatch. In the case when the last role, Woodpecker, is not active, the model simulates the 
behavior of the 3rd player to imitate the behavior of player 1, Treecreeper.  
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Figure 11. Three player roles representing logging companies 
 
5.5 Game walkthrough  
The game goes through three stages: introduction, logging task and debrief. See Table 5 for a 
full explanation.  
 
Sequence of events Description 
Introduction The context, the objective and the rules of the game are described (see Figure 12). 
The players are instructed to find the balance between satisfying the demand of 
Treezonians and abiding by the legal quota (see full instructions in Appendix 4). 
Logging task Each round the players are presented with information about the state of the forest, 
news regarding inspection and sanctioning in the game, the quota set by the 
government, the demand from the customers and their score (see Figure 13 for an 
example). The task of the player is to make a decision on their logging level before 
they proceed onto the next round. 
Debrief The results of the game are displayed in the final stage (see Figure 14). In addition, 
the players can see time-series information about the forest and each player’s 
logging level. 
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Figure 12. Introduction page 
 
5.6 User interface and game availability 
5.6.1 Overview 
The user interface was designed using Stella Architect and published on the isee Exchange 
platform (https://exchange.iseesystems.com/) with all rights reserved through paid hosting 
from isee Systems from May 13th to June 13th. It was designed to be compatible with all 
devices, especially wide desktops and tablets (16:9). 
 
5.6.2 Timeline and forest cover 
The uppermost part of the Dashboard (see Figure 13) depicts the year, which changes each 
round. Further, the forest cover is represented both as a number and visualized as trees. Each 
tree represents 10% of forest cover so that three green trees mean that the forest cover is at 
30%.   
 
5.6.3 Calculations 
On the right part of the Dashboard page, there are the calculations which capture the 
performance of the player in the last round. The purpose of this section is to continuously 
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Figure 13. Dashboard page 
 
 
Figure 14. Debrief page 
 
5.6.4 News  
The news section is triggered whenever an event happens in the game. Events include: (1) a 
player successfully passing inspection, (2) a player getting away with illegal logging, (3) a 
player getting sanctioned, (4) one of the other players getting sanctioned or (5) no news. All 
news is presented simultaneously, as if it were on a newspaper front page.  
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5.6.5 Decision box 
The decision box displays the quota and the demand for the upcoming 3 years. This is the part 
of the interface where the participants input their decision. 
 
5.6.6 Game progress bar 
Last, at the bottom of the screen there is a game progress bar depicting how far along in the 
game a player is.  
 
5.7 Game assumptions 
The simulation game has a research purpose (see Table 3). For this purpose, several 
assumptions have been made: 
 
1) Probabilistic monitoring. The frequency of monitoring is determined according to a 
probability function, which is a simplified assumption of how monitoring decisions 
actually take place. 
 
2) Simultaneous monitoring. In the game either all players are monitored or none of the 
players is monitored. This, again, is a simplified assumption which is not representative 
of the real-world where monitoring need not be simultaneous.  
 
3) All sanctions are executed. In other words, there are no barriers to sanction execution. 
A player is sanctioned once caught logging illegally, with no exceptions. 
 
4) Perfect news. News in the game are timely and correct. There are no instances of fake 
news and every passed inspection or instance of having gotten with illegal logging is 
reported privately, while every sanction is reported publicly.   
 
5) No communication. Players are not able to communicate during the course of the game. 
Hence, they are not in a position to create side-agreements or disclose additional 
information.   
 
6) Score privacy. I have assumed that players do not know one another’s scores. The 
scores of all players are only revealed at the end of the game. The justification behind 
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this assumption is that loggers (or logging companies) do not have insights onto one 
another’s earnings.   
 
7) Perfect information on forest cover. I assume that players are not subject to any biases 
or barriers to information collection regarding the forest. Thus, they are presented with 
perfect information on the forest cover throughout the entire game.  
 
8) Finite number of rounds. The players know the number of rounds in advance, which is 
only representative of fixed-term tenure agreements.  
 
5.8 Game testing 
The game development process was iterative, jumping between game building and game 
testing. Once the final version of the game was completed, I performed a series of test to ensure 
that the game is user-ready, both within Stella Architect and using the online version on the 
isee Exchange platform.   
 
5.8.1 Scoring function test 
The purpose of this test is to test the consistency between the score calculations displayed on 
the interface and the expected calculations solved manually. The test revealed slight 
discrepancies, which was due to integration being used as a calculation technique, which is 
more suited to continuous calculations as opposed to the discrete calculations displayed on the 
interface. For this reason, a rounding function was added to the equation for Individual quota 
(see Appendix 3) and I rounded all displayed numbers on the interface to a precision of 1.   
 
5.8.2 News function test 
Next, I did some game runs (including both compliant and noncompliant behavior) in order to 
test whether the interface displays news in the envisioned times. The test revealed proper of 
the functioning of the interface. In other words, participants were correctly informed when they 
passed inspection, got away with illegal logging, were sanctioned or when another player got 
sanctioned.  
 
5.8.3 Player-specific information test 
Moreover, I ran a test in order to examine whether the information displayed on the interface 
for each player is specific to the role chosen by the player. For example, I checked to see 
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whether the Debrief page (see Figure 14) displayed the score and loss information for the 
appropriate player. The game passed this test successfully.  
 
5.8.4 Interface sensitivity test  
Last, I tested the sensitivity of the game to extreme values of Extraction level. The purpose of 
this was to see whether the game would behave correctly or crash when players exhibited 
unanticipated behavior. See Table 6 for the details of the tests conducted. The results of the 
test revealed that the game reacted appropriately with slight deviations. Most importantly, the 
game was not sensitive to an Extraction level that exceeded the quota by 1, indicating that if a 
player exceeds the quota by 1, they would not be caught for noncompliance despite getting 
away with a higher score. The reason for this bug is due to the rounding equations in the game 
(see Appendix 3).  
 
Extraction level Expected behavior Game behavior 
Extremely high value (1000)  Extremely high value (1000) Extremely high value (1000) 
Negative value (-5) 0 0 
Non-integer (0.0001, 3.5) Rounded values Rounded values 
Non-number character (a, b, !) No expectation Default extraction level (83) 
Number exceeding quota by 1, 2, or 
3 m" 
Notification of getting sanctioned 
or having gotten away with illegal 
logging. Correct calculations. 
Notifications were as expected 
for 2 and 3, but not for 1. The 
calculations were correct. 
Table 6. Game interface sensitivity tests 
 
5.9 Calibration of the game 
The game was calibrated based on data from Canada in order to be representative of a forest 
use system from the real world (see section 4.9.3). However, the numbers were divided by 1 
million and rounded in order to provide a more user-friendly experience. Additionally, 
Fractional demand growth rate is calibrated to 1% due to an estimated average growth rate of 
1% of the Canadian logging industry during the period 2015-2020 (IBISworld, 2020) and an 
average 1% annual change in the global wood industry (FAO, 2009b). The exact calibration is 
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Variable Value 
Forest area (1980) 350 
Maximum forest area 910 
Growing stock (1980) 63800 
Allowable annual cut (1980) 250 
Desired allowable annual cut (1980) 250 
Individual quota (1980) 75 
Demand 110 
Reference growth rate 1 
Marginal hectare per growing stock increment 0.0048 
Desired allowable annual cut adjustment time 50 
Table 7. Game calibration 
 
5.10 Game behavior 
The incentive structure in the game effectively yields two strategic choices to players: either to 
comply with the rules and get a small but secure gain or not to comply with the rules and risk 
getting a big gain or a big loss. Thus, the range of game behavior is either total compliance, 




Figure 15. Game behavior 
 
Figure 15 shows two extremes of game behavior – total compliance and total noncompliance. 
While, total compliance results in no sanctions or losses from sanctions and a decreasingly 
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from sanctions and oscillations in the cumulative score. The behavior of the score is due to the 
incentive structure (an ever-more increasing gap between the quota and demand), which slows 
down the increase in score of compliant players. While, the oscillations in score for 
noncompliant behavior are due to the presence of a monitoring and sanctioning mechanism.  
 
The forest area for total compliance decreases very slowly, which is expected given that the 
game’s calibration id based on the Canada run (see section 4.9.3). Whereas the forest area for 
total noncompliance decreases at an increasing rate, indicating that the situation is getting out 
of the government’s hands. This behavior is due to the game structure, which effectively breaks 
loops B2 and B3, so the system is no longer dominated by these loops. Instead, the negative 
exponential drop in forest area is the result of dominance of the reinforcing loop describing 
exponential growth in demand.   
 
Perhaps the most interesting part of game behavior is that of the individual quota. We can see 
that the individual quota is the same for total compliance and total noncompliance until 2018. 
After 2018, the individual quota for total noncompliance drops further than that for total 
compliance. Moreover, if we run the simulation longer, until 2050, we can see that the gap 
between Individual quota of each run is increasing. This is the ‘tragedy of the commons’ effect. 
The quota is gradually lowered as an attempt to bring the system to an equilibrium through 
wood removal regulation following the highest-first principle (see section 4.10.1). However, 
noncompliant player behavior, which is synonymous to treating the public forest as an open-
access resource as described in the tragedy of the commons, decreases the quota more quickly 
and dramatically than compliant player behavior does, leading to total forest destruction.   
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Chapter 6: Pilot experiment 
The aim of the pilot experiment is to test the usefulness of the game, described in Chapter 5, 
yielding insights on rule compliance in public forests for the purpose of answering RQ3. At 
the same time, it is important to emphasize that this is a pilot experiment, which can be 
understood as small-scale intervention in which both quantitative and qualitative data is 
collected for analysis. As such the pilot experiment is conducted in preparation of a full-scale 
quantitative experiment in a controlled environment (Saunders & Lewis, 2012: 114).  
 
6.1 Rationale 
The reason for using a pilot experiment was briefly mentioned in Chapter 4. Namely, the 
existing model structure was not able to fully explain Wood removal neither in the Canada run 
nor in the global run. Because of this I concluded that there is a lack of understanding about 
the drivers of wood removal decisions. Experiments performed with simulation games can help 
with behavior validation and elicit information on uncertain model structure (Sterman, 1987). 
Their findings can be used to both improve model structure and model calibration. However, I 
opted for a pilot experiment instead of a full-scale experiment because of the limited timeframe 
available for this research. In fact, Saunders & Lewis (2012: 115) praise the use of pilot 
experiments as a way of refining the data collection procedure and in that way improving the 
success rate of the eventual full-scale experiment. Moreover, the exploratory nature of RQ3 




Participants were recruited from a population of laypeople, i.e. people who are not real decision 
makers in forest use systems. In addition, all participants had personal acquaintance with the 
researcher with the idea that this would maintain homogeneity and positively influence 
engagement and self-disclosure. No reward was given; hence participation was voluntary.  
 
6.3 Sampling  
A sample of 19 participants were recruited using the principal of theoretical saturation. 
Namely, recruitment stopped when no new concepts emerged from the pilot experiment. In 
addition, there was an attempt to control for diversity, yielding a homogenous sample, which 
is more likely to produce consistent results from which it would be easier to interpret meaning.  
 
 
- 52 - 
6.4 Design  
All participants were part of a single group that followed the same procedure as is typical in 
pre-experimental designs (Salkind, 2010: 1258). This design does not test any specific 
hypothesis, but rather it is of an inductive nature, where data is collected during and post-
intervention and then analyzed for the purpose of inducing hypothesis that can be testes in an 
experimental setting.  
 
6.5 Procedure  
The participants were recruited with the offer of playing a logging game online. No further 
instructions were given other than those on the interface of the game. After recruitment, the 
participants were asked to sign a consent form and sent a link to a join a specific game session. 
Each participant played the game online on their own, with the researcher as a second player 
and an automated player simulated by the model to copy the game play of the researcher.  
 
Since the game is designed as a multiplayer game to be played with at least 2 and at most 3 
players, I developed a standard scheme for the behavior of the other 2 players. The rationale 
behind the scheme, which is portrayed in Table 8, is to display a diverse range of behavior that 
would enable all the functions of the game, i.e. would enable the participant to experience the 
notification of the other player having been sanctioned. In addition, this specific scheme was 
developed to yield an estimate for a comparatively bad score. Specifically, the score for this 
player scheme equals 142 points, which is just a little above the score of a game run of total 
noncompliance as shown in Chapter 5 (131 points). The idea behind this was that the effect of 
winning the game would positively influence participant self-disclosure in the interview.   
 
 
Table 8. Scheme for player 1 and 3. 
 
At the end of the game the participants were asked to join an online interview. The purpose of 
the post-game interview is to elicit data on how the participants used the information on the 
interface to justify their decisions in the game, thus answering RQ3. In particular, the interface 
contained varied information which represented the physical system and the inter-actor 
environment (see Table 3) and is expected to stimulate participant reasoning.  Find the full 
Year 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016
Action Not comply Comply Comply Not comply Not comply Comply Comply Comply Not comply Not comply Not comply Comply Comply
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interview guide in Appendix 6. Verbal statements were audio recorded and analyzed in 
reference to the results of the game run.  
 
6.6 Data analysis 
Pilot experiment data analysis helped identify initial insights regarding the reasons for 
compliance. In particular, I interpreted the reasoning for compliance in light of when 
noncompliant behavior took place and why.  
 
6.6.1 Quantitative data analysis 
Descriptive statistics for the pilot experiment results were sufficient to portray when 
noncompliance took place. In addition, I conducted some bivariate analysis in order to see 
whether there is any link between compliance and other indicators such as payoffs, score and 
forest cover. Moreover, I calculated the incidence of noncompliance when a participant 
received news notifications on the interface in order to see whether any particular notification 
resulted in a large incidence of noncompliance as well as to compare the incidences of 
noncompliance following different notifications. These analyses served to illuminate the 
reasoning of participants by identifying a pattern in quantitative data, which was informative 
of the triggers of compliance. See the full process in Figure 16. 
 
 
Figure 16. Description of quantitative data analysis process. The arrows denote sequence 
 
6.6.2 Qualitative data analysis 
Interview data was most useful for revealing why participants made their decisions, hinting at 
their reasoning. For this purpose, I first did a non-verbatim transcription of the interviews. 
Next, I deductively coded the transcript according to two frameworks: the theoretical 
framework for rule compliance (see Appendix 8) and a framework according to the interface 
(see Appendix 9). The latter was created in order to display the qualitative results in a manner 
that will allow me to cross-reference them with the quantitative results. Last, inductive axial 
coding was applied to the data in order to capture remaining insights (see Appendix 10). The 
full process of qualitative data analysis is visible in Figure 17.  
 
Data processing Bivariate analysis Cluster specificdescriptive statistics
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Figure 17. Description of qualitative data analysis process. The arrows denote sequence. 
 
6.6.3 Cluster analysis 
Since the data exhibited high variance, I conducted cluster analysis in order to make more 
meaning out of the data and see whether there are any cluster-specific features in the data. The 
clusters were first identified through inductive coding (see Appendix 11). Following this, each 
participant was ascribed to a cluster (see section 7.4). Finally, the quantitative results were 
presented for each cluster separately, with special emphasis on the effect of news notifications 
on compliance.  
 
6.6 Research ethics 
This thesis adhered to the Academy of Management code of ethics (Academy of Management, 
2006) and those described in Denscombe (2012: 121), including:  
 
Transparency 
Participants were asked to sign consent forms for recording audio during the interview. In 
addition to this, participants were offered access to the final version of this thesis.  
 
Non-identifiable data 
No personal information that allows for identification of participants was recorded.  
 
Confidentiality  
All of data gathered during this research will is kept confidential and not shared with third 
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Chapter 7: Results   
The results of the pilot experiment are presented in this chapter. Their interpretation is the 
subject of Chapter 8.  
 
7.1 Overview 
Overall, participants showed a generally positive level of compliance3 throughout the rounds, 
with values ranging from 69% to 90% in any given round (see Figure 18). The only information 
we can extract from this graph is that compliance behavior stabilized as the rounds progressed, 
suggesting that participants increased their commitment to a certain kind of behavior 
throughout the rounds. This overview should be looked at from the point of view of the 
individual as there was great variance between participant behavior. Specifically, the amount 
of illegal logging each participant did ranged from no illegal logging to 765m!	(see Figure 19).  
 
 
Figure 18. Compliance level throughout rounds 
 
In regard to the extent of noncompliance, most participants played the game as it is designed. 
In other words, they either complied with the quota or logged the full demand. However, there 
were some participants who only logged a little, even though it is irrational to do so according 
to the game rules, stating that they were either ‘scared to log more than a few m3 illegally’ or 
that they ‘thought that there was a link between the amount of illegal logging and getting 
monitored’ as a reason for this behavior. This brought the average extent of illegal logging to 
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be only 75% of the full gap between the demand and the quota, which is considered as a 
reference value for illegal logging.   
 
Figure 19. Total amount of illegal logging per participant4 
 
All in all, 14 participants won and 5 lost the game, i.e. they performed worse than the scheme 
created for the other 2 players (see Table 8).  
 
7.2 Quantitative results 
Throughout the rounds of the game the payoff for compliance got smaller, while the potential 
gain from illegal activities became larger. In other words, the conditions became tougher as the 
game progressed with lower rewards for compliant behavior. As shown on the graph (see 
Figure 20), this did not have a significant effect on compliance. In fact, it can be seen that 
compliance is highest in the last rounds and lowest in the first rounds. Thus, on an aggregate 
level there isn’t an effect of payoff on compliance. This issue will be analyzed thoroughly in 




4 Because the game proved insensitive to logging levels that exceed the quota by 1 (see section 5.8), those 
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Figure 20. The relationship between compliance and payoff for compliance 
 
Interestingly, even though the instructions (see Appendix 4) did not state that getting the 
highest score is the objective of the game, almost all participants played in a score-seeking 
manner. Similar to payoff, no significant trend can be seen in the relationship between 
compliance and the score (see Figure 21). Both negative and positive scores inspired 
noncompliant behavior. This result suggests the need for further cluster analysis, which will 
help highlight emerging insights from the data.  
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7 EIL 8 EIL
9 EIL 10 EIL
11 EIL 12 EIL
13 EIL 14 EIL
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Next, the effect of notifications on the interface on participant compliance was described by 
calculating the incidence of noncompliance in the rounds where such notifications were 
displayed to participants (see Table 9). Interestingly, the largest incidence of noncompliance 
was right after participants were notified that they got away with illegal logging and the lowest 
incidence of noncompliance was right after the participants passed inspection. This indicates 
that sanctioning is a key mechanism for influencing noncompliance. Further, receiving news 
that the other player got sanctioned also resulted in low incidence compared to the other types 
of news, signaling that this type of news had a comparatively positive effect on compliance. 
Last, there was less illegal logging when participants were sanctioned compared to when they 
had gotten away with illegal logging. But, at the same time, the incidence of noncompliance 
was larger after the receipt of sanction compared to after receipt of news of having gotten 
sanctioned. This is probably due to the fact that compliant participants never got into the 
situation of getting sanctioned, therefore they did not contribute to that statistic, whereas they 
frequently passed inspections and received news that the other player was sanctioned and thus 
brought down the incidence of noncompliance for those events. Again, little can be said about 
the significance of this result because of the small sample size, which is likely one of the drivers 
of variance in the data.  
 
News Incidence of noncompliance 
Another player was sanctioned 0.16 
Passed inspection 0.15 
Sanctioned 0.23 
Got away with illegal logging 0.35 
Table 9. Incidence of noncompliance as an effect of news notification 
 
In addition, the news notifications were not mutually exclusive, so two news notifications could 
occur simultaneously. For example, a player might have been notified that they have been 
sanctioned and that the other player has been sanctioned too. Because of this I calculated the 
incidence of noncompliance for combinations of news notifications to see if any additional 
insights arise (see Appendix 7). Interestingly, the incidence of noncompliance was higher when 
 
 
5 A mistake was discovered in the middle of the data collection period. Namely, the notification regarding getting 
away with illegal logging was triggered in round 8 despite compliant behavior. This was fixed starting with 
participant 9. Hence, the data regarding this notification was processed twice. The number on the table is the result 
of modified data taking into account the instances of false triggering.  
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players were notified that they had passed inspection compared to when they were notified that 
they had passed inspection and that the other player has been sanction. Moreover, there was a 
larger incidence of compliance when players got sanctioned compared to when both they and 
the other player got sanctioned. The indication from this is that players felt re-assured when 
they read news about the other player and played either more cautiously or more 
opportunistically depending on what their previous move was.  
 
In regard to the effect of forest area on compliant behavior, a stable pattern can be observed 
(see Figure 22). This suggests that there is no effect of forest area on illegal logging activity. 
 
 
Figure 22. The relationship between average forest area and extent of illegal logging 
 
7.3 Qualitative results 
7.3.1 Insights on participant behavior based on interface framework 
Most participants agreed that getting sanctioned motivated them to comply in the next round. 
Although, a few stated that they were not convinced by the first sanction since they did not 
think they would get monitored two times in a row. After getting sanctioned two times in a 
row, all participants stated that they had become convinced that illegal logging is not worth it. 
Of course, not all participants got themselves in a situation where they could get sanctioned. 
In fact, those that abided by the quota in all rounds portrayed a very negative perception of the 
sanction, claiming that getting all logs removed is a very detrimental penalty. 
 
Further, the participants had a diverse range of responses to passing inspection. One stated that 
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informed their calculation as part of their decision-making strategy. Those that find it 
rewarding complied in the next round and found it reinforced their strategy. While, others chose 
not to comply in the consecutive round, as they assumed that they would not get checked in 
the next round. 
 
On the other hand, getting away with illegal logging motivated two types of responses. Those 
that continued to log illegally in the next round felt that they could get away with it again, while 
those that complied felt lucky and expressed that one sneaky success was enough for them. 
 
Most of the participants stated that they were tempted to log illegally as a result of the 
increasing gap between the quota and the demand, but not all of them did due to difference in 
their strategies. Not all participants expressed such reasoning. Some justified the increase in 
demand as a result of previous illegal logging activity. There were a few exceptions of 
participants who said that they did not care for the increasing gap because they were only 
focused on other things, stating that they might have found it more influential if the change 
was more dramatic. Moreover, there were also those whose strategy was strict compliance that 
stated that they did not even pay attention to demand as their main attention was on meeting 
the quota. Similarly, those that were noncompliant stated that they did no pay too much 
attention to the quota, but rather on changes in demand. These comments were illuminating of 
a phenomenon of selective attention.   
 
The most common reaction to a negative score was compliance as participants expressed a 
strong aversion to it. In fact, many stated that despite a general noncompliant strategy, they 
complied in order to build up a positive score which they deemed to be enough before they 
could take the leap to log illegally again. Similarly, there were some statements that once the 
participants reached a satisfactory score, they proceeded with a compliant strategy in order to 
maintain it. This means that participants expressed the biggest willingness to log illegally when 
they had a subjectively low positive score. Last, not all participants were influenced by the 
score as they stated that they did not feel like they were competing because they could not see 
the score of other players.  
 
Most participants either completely disregarded the forest cover or claimed that they did not 
see any change in it, even though the forest cover fell by 1% during the rounds. In the word of 
one participant: “If you are focused on earning points you don’t really pay attention to the 
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forest area”. Further, there were two participants who were confused about the forest cover and 
how it was connected to the rest of the game, highlighting naivety on the issue. Notably, there 
were three participants that expressed that the forest cover was at the center of their attention, 
either because they felt it gave them valuable information about the behavior of others or 
because they were expecting the forest cover to increase as a result of their actions.   
 
Last, many participants felt competitive when reading news that one of the other players had 
been sanctioned, stating that they felt happy and proud of their own performance in the game 
and at times comforted that they were not the only ones losing points. In addition, they used 
this information to inform their anticipation of when monitoring takes place, most often 
responding with compliance as a result of caution. There were also those who expressed that 
the information was not influential for them because they were playing the game 
noncompetitively. Interestingly, one of the participants expressed that the fact others got 
sanctioned inspired them to log even less as a form of compensation for protecting the forest 
cover. All in all, the participants stated that the other player was an important part of their 
experience and that if they could see that the other players were abiding by the quota, it might 
have influenced them to comply too.  
 
7.3.2 Insights on participant behavior based on theoretical framework 
In regard to extrinsic motivation, most participants stated that they took the probability of 
getting monitored into account when making their decisions, with most stating that they 
followed a specific heuristic and then calculated estimations for it accordingly and few who 
stated that this was done intuitively without much thought. Next, some of the compliant 
participants stated that the penalty level was very high, while the rest did not discuss the penalty 
level at all. Finally, some participants emphasized illegal gains as the reason for their 
noncompliant behavior, declaring that at the illegal gains were higher later on in the game. In 
light of this, there might be a possible link between the perception of the penalty level and the 
attitude to the probability of getting monitored, as those that perceived the sanction as too high 
did not bother with anticipating it, while those that did not perceive as too high either attempted 
to calculate it or anticipated it intuitively.  
 
The legitimacy of the government quota emerged as intrinsic motivator for participants. One 
of them stated that they trust that the government has established a quota that is sustainable and 
therefore complied. On the other hand, two participants expressed doubts that the government 
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quota is less than is actually sustainable and therefore used this as a reason to log less than the 
legal quota.  
 
Several participants related to the notification that other players got sanctioned as a reason they 
overstepped the quota, with one emphasizing that they had been brought up playing games 
where the norm is to cheat. There were also expressions of despair regarding the norm of 
unethical behavior and one optimistic statement of a participant who said that they might have 
been more motivated to comply had they seen that others were complying too.  
 
Apart from the social norm, morals and values were also expressed as motivators for participant 
behavior. Most of the participants who talked about the importance of law and the significance 
of protecting the environment did in-fact comply. However, there were a few exceptions of 
participants who did not comply but still mentioned morals in the interview.  
 
7.3.3 Insights from axial coding 
There were many remarks on the process of getting familiar with the game. Specifically, the 
majority of participants stated that they started off with compliant behavior initially just to get 
a sense of how the game works. In addition, few stated that they started gambling immediately, 
i.e. logging illegally, as a way of getting themselves acquainted with the mechanics of the 
game. And last, one participant stated that they immediately started experimenting with logging 
less than the quota in order to see whether the forest cover would rise as a way of getting more 
closely acquainted with the game.  
 
Not only a way of learning how the game works, logging less than the quota was an experiment 
conducted by four participants, who were all disappointed to have their expectations 
unfulfilled, indicating a misperception of the delays in the system. Although one pointed the 
finger at the other players as the reason for their failed experiment.  
 
Similarly, a few participants took the decrease in quota personally, stating that they had 
expected to be rewarded for compliant behavior with an eventual quota increase as opposed to 
experiencing tougher conditions later on in the game. In fact, one participant stated that this 
was the sole reason they changed their decision-making in the game from compliance to 
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On the topic of motivations for noncompliant behavior, several participants expressed that they 
felt that they should cheat at least once, just as an adventure, indicating exploratory curiosity 
as a motive.  
 
A few common beliefs were expressed during the course of the interview, especially on the 
topic of monitoring. Some participants believed that monitoring was random, while others 
strongly believed that it was connected to their illegal activity. Many expressed that they did 
not believe that monitoring would take place in two consecutive rounds, although they were 
disproved, and one participant expressed a belief that monitoring would take place almost every 
round. Moreover, a few stated that they believed demand has risen only because they had not 
been able to meet past demand due to being sanctioned. A possible takeaway from this is 
regarding the tendency to ascribe personalized causal reasoning for changes in game 
conditions, especially when faced with uncertainty.  
 
7.4 Analysis 
In order to make more meaning out of the data, I applied inductive coding to the data and 
identified the following clusters (see Appendix 11):   
• Competitive compliant 
• Competitive noncompliant 
• Noncompetitive compliant 
• Noncompetitive noncompliant 
 
Following this, I classified each participant in one of the four possible clusters by cross-
referencing their verbal statements and quantitative results. The participants differed on two 
dimensions: whether they were competitive or not and whether they thought compliance or 
noncompliance was the way to reach their goal.  
 
The first dimension, competitiveness, describes the goal of the participants. In particular, 
competitive participants aimed to finish the game with the highest score in order to be better 
than others, while noncompetitive participants had different goals such as maintaining forest 
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Next, the second dimension, describes the manner in which the participants aim to reach their 
goal. For example, competitive noncompliant participants strategically logged illegally in order 
to maximize their score and do better than the other players, while competitive compliant 
participants thought that the best way of beating others was not to maximize their score, but 
rather to abide by the quota and count on other players getting sanctioned, so that they come 
out as winners in the long run.  
 
Further, noncompetitive noncompliant participants were driven to strategically log illegally in 
order to meet the most demand or just for the thrill of avoiding sanction, while noncompetitive 
compliant participants reasoned that the best way of reaching their individual goal was to 
comply and even log much less than the allowed quota.  
 
It can be said that this cluster division describes two characteristics: strategy and motivation. 
Namely, participants either adopted a compliant or noncompliant strategy and their motivation 




Motivation Competitive Competitive compliant Competitive noncompliant 
Noncompetitive Noncompetitive compliant Noncompetitive noncompliant 
Table 10. Description of clusters 
 
7.4.1 Competitive noncompliant 
Competitive noncompliant logged illegally compared competitive compliant participants. This 
can be clearly seen though looking at the extent of illegal logging of each participant (see 
Figure 23, 24, 25 and 26). Participants who have been clustered as noncompliant have a higher 
average to maximum ratio when compared to compliant participants, i.e. they cheated more 
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Figure 23. Extent of illegal logging of competitive noncompliant participants 
 
These participants were clustered as competitive because they expressed that their main 
motivation came from beating others or beating the game. More precisely, they emphasized 
the importance of the score and the anticipation of monitoring as their main drivers. In the 
words of two participants:  
 
“I wanted to earn points and the way to do that was to cheat”  
 
“At first, I followed the rules in order to get a sense of the frequency of monitoring. But after 
not getting inspected in the first round I got eager and tried to cheat. You can say that my 
main strategy driver was trying to guess when monitoring took place.” 
 
7.4.2 Noncompetitive noncompliant 
Similarly, noncompetitive noncompliant participants logged illegally compared to 
noncompetitive compliant participants (see Figure 23, 24, 25 and 26) as evidenced by the 
difference in average to maximum ratio. Next, noncompetitive noncompliant participants were 
not focused on beating others, but rather on meeting demand as best they can. In the words of 
one participant: 
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Figure 24. Extent of illegal logging of noncompetitive noncompliant participants 
 
7.4.3 Competitive compliant 
Competitive compliant participants did not log illegally, or they only did it once, as evidenced 
by the low average to maximum ratio (see Figure 25). Like competitive noncompliant 
participants, they too were motivated to beat others, but they thought that the best way to do 
that would be to log illegally. They expressed the score, seeing others get sanctioned and 
sanction avoidance as their main motivators that helped them reason through their strategy. 
Examples of their reasoning include:  
 
“Something in me told me to follow the rules. I thought that if I went by the quota all of the 
time that that would eventually balance out and I would come out as a winner.” 
 
“My strategy was focused on occasionally point grabbing, but ultimately mostly driven by 
punishment avoidance.” 
 
“I wanted to win the game by beating others as opposed to maximizing my points. My 
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Figure 25. Extent of illegal logging of competitive compliant participants 
 
7.4.4 Noncompetitive compliant 
Last, noncompetitive compliant participants were not focused on beating others and tended not 
to log illegally (see Figure 26). One of these cases did log illegally but stated that they felt 
pushed to comply as the best way of satisfying demand, which is not a competitive motive.  
 
 
Figure 26. Extent of illegal logging of noncompetitive compliant participants 
 
Their specific statement was:  
 
“Overall, I wanted to satisfy the people. I was really scared and risk averse. In my reflection I 
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Others emphasized the forest cover or the quota itself as their main motivation. Their words 
included:  
 
“My strategy was: abide by the rules, don’t be greedy and then you’ll be all good.” 
 
“My goal was to keep the forest cover as high as possible.” 
 
 
7.4.5 Effect of news on clusters 
Noncompliant participants with both competitive (p5 and p17) and noncompetitive (p1 and 
p14) motivation logged illegally after receiving news that the other player had been sanctioned 
(see Figure 27). It can be said that competitive participants logged illegally more often than 
noncompetitive participants because of the higher average extent of illegal logging. 
Additionally, one noncompetitive compliant logged illegally after receiving this notification 
(p15).   
 
 
Figure 27. Extent of illegal logging as a response to receiving news that the other player has been sanctioned 
 
Next, almost all noncompliant participants (with the exception of p4 and p12) reacted with 
noncompliance to having passed inspection (see Figure 28). Notably, noncompetitive 
participants logged illegally more often when they received this notification compared to 
competitive participants. Further, two compliant participants reacted with noncompliance to 
having passed inspection, one with competitive motivation (p3) and one with noncompetitive 
motivation (p15). Compared to receiving news that the other player got sanctioned, it can be 
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This is visible due to the fact that the averages are higher on Figure 27 compared to Figure 28, 
which indicates that a few select participants were very reactive to receiving news that the other 
player got sanctioned, even though there was more noncompliance after participants received 
news that they had passed inspection. This is also in line with the incidence calculation (see 
Table 9), as the incidence for noncompliance is lower after having passed inspection compared 
to after receiving notification that the other player got sanctioned.  
 
 
Figure 28. Extent of illegal logging as a response to receiving news of having passed inspection 
 
Getting sanctioned inspired compliance in most participants (see Figure 29) apart from a few 
noncompliant participants with both competitive (p4 and p5) and noncompetitive motivations 
(p1 and p14). Moreover, there was one competitive compliant participant reacted with 
noncompliance to getting sanctioned (p10). It can be seen that there was more illegal behavior 
after passing inspection than after being sanctioned.  
 
 
























































































- 70 - 
Last, receiving news of having gotten away with illegal logging motivated four noncompliant 
participants to log illegally, out of which three were with a competitive agenda (p2, p4, p12), 
one noncompetitive (p13). In addition to this, there was one noncompetitive compliant 
participant (p15) who acted on the temptation. This wide-spread distribution of noncompliance 
among the clusters (see Figure 30), taken together with the relatively high incidence rate (see 
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Chapter 8: Discussion and conclusions 
I started this thesis with the aim of studying reasoning behind rule compliance in public forests. 
I focused on wood as a specific resource and the allowable annual cut as a governing rule (see 
Chapter 1). This quest led me through a deep dive in academic literature, yielding a theoretical 
framework explaining the drivers of rule compliance (see Chapter 2). Following this, I 
consulted reports on the state of global forests and documents detailing their management 
procedures, which I used as source material for constructing a model (see Chapter 4). Next, I 
proceeded with the development of a multiplayer online simulation game of a public forest (see 
Chapter 5). The game enabled me to design a pilot experiment for the purpose of reaching my 
research aim (see Chapter 6). Finally, the results of the pilot experiment (see Chapter 7) yielded 
rich data on which I discuss my contribution in this chapter.  
 
8.1 Answers to research questions 
 
RQ1: What relevant concepts and frameworks exist for explaining reasoning behind rule 
compliance in public forests?  
 
There are two streams of thought describing reasoning behind rule compliance: instrumental 
and normative. The instrumental stream represents concepts which serve to explain compliance 
as a utilitarian act which seeks to maximize gain. As such, these concepts are also referred to 
as extrinsic motivators and are the subject of neoclassical deterrence models. Among them are 
(1) the illegal gain from noncompliance, defined as the perceived value of gain for a 
successfully pulled off act of noncompliance, (2) the probability of getting sanctioned, 
representing the individual’s perception of the functioning of the enforcement mechanism and 
their personal attitude to risk, and (3) the penalty level, which is the perceived value of the 
sanction for noncompliance. Next, normative reasoning describes social and personal norms, 
which are irrespective of the economic context, and can be thought of as internal motivators. 
The social norm, or the perceived actions of others, legitimacy, representing the perceived 
fairness of the governing rule, and morals and values, which are perceived internalized 
principles, all come together to influence decision-making. These concepts come together in a 
theoretical framework (see Figure 2). Refer to Chapter 2 for a full summary of existing research 
on compliance.  
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RQ2: What system dynamics structure can be used to build a simulation game that mimics a 
situation where individuals make decisions to either comply with the governing rules of public 
forests or not?  
 
A system dynamics model that describes the relationship between the state of the public forest 
and the annual allowable cut was built for the purpose of simulating a decision-making 
situation for studying compliance behavior.  
 
The model captured the dynamics of the forest, including forest growth represented through a 
reinforcing ‘forest growth’ loop and a balancing ‘limits to growth’ loop, and the effect of policy 
on the forest, through a balancing ‘wood regulation’ loop and a reinforcing loop encouraging 
growth when the forest is above the maximum sustainable yield level. The source material used 
for building the model was a textbook on forest growth and yield modeling for the forest 
structure, and government documents for the policy structure. Next, the model was calibrated 
through partial-model calibration using a dataset on global forests from the FAO and a dataset 
on Canadian forests from the government of Canada. This resulted in three model simulation 
runs: Equilibrium, Global and Canada run. The equilibrium run was used for analysis of model 
structure, while the Global and Canada run were compared with the corresponding datasets. 
While the model could successfully reproduce much of the data, it was not a good explanation 
for the wood removal function, highlighting the importance of the aim of this study.   
 
While, Chapter 4 elaborates on the model, Chapter 5 describes a simulation game that elicits 
information on rule compliance in public forests. Several modifications were added to the 
model and an interactive interface was created for this purpose. Namely, an incentive structure 
representing increasing demand for wood, probability-based monitoring, a sanctioning 
structure and, finally, a scoring structure that ties all of them together. This specific game 
formulation created an environment where players are faced with increasing potential payoffs 
for noncompliance, decreasing payoffs for compliance and an uncertain monitoring 
mechanism. It is important to note that the game was multi-player, so players could receive 
notifications that one of the other players has gotten sanctioned.  
 
RQ3: What initial insights can be derived about reasoning behind rule compliance from the 
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Overall, the takeaway from pilot experiment is that the possible range of reasoning for 
compliance was wider than that for noncompliance. This means that compliant participants 
varied in their reasoning, while noncompliant participants tended to emphasize the same 
reasons. Specifically, the most commonly used reason for noncompliance was illegal gains, 
with some noncompliant participants also emphasizing the probability of getting sanctioned, 
social norms and morals and values as a reason for their decisions. 
 
Results of the pilot experiment (see Chapter 7) showed a somewhat stable level of compliance 
throughout the rounds, ranging from 80% to 90% of participants complying in any given round. 
At first glance, the quantitative results could not be explained through changes in payoffs, score 
or forest cover. Additionally, the qualitative results depicted big variance in participant 
responses. In light of this, clustering analysis was done for the purpose of deriving some 
insights on the research question. Specifically, the clustering analysis was done through 
inductive coding of qualitative data whereby each participant was classified in one of four 
possible clusters.   
 
The cluster analysis divided participants according to their strategy: compliant and 
noncompliant, and their motivation: competitive and noncompetitive. Competitive participants 
emphasized the score in their reasoning, while noncompetitive participants emphasized 
demand and forest cover. Interestingly, both competitive and noncompetitive participants 
emphasized sanction avoidance as part of their reasoning. Noncompliant participants 
emphasized the score, anticipation of monitoring and demand as their reasons, while compliant 
participants focused on the score, sanction avoidance, seeing others sanctioned, forest cover 
and demand while explaining their decisions.  
 
Verbal statements were first coded according to the theoretical framework and then cross-
referenced with the cluster analysis in order to create an overall view of the theoretical reasons 
for compliance used by each cluster (see Figure 31). On the whole, it is visible that 
noncompetitive noncompliant participants had fewest reasons for their behavior, while 
competitive compliant and noncompetitive compliant participants had a plethora of reasons for 
justifying their behavior. Overall, it is clear that noncompliant participants used less reasons to 
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In terms of specific reasoning, illegal gains were used exclusively by noncompliant 
participants, while the penalty level and legitimacy were used exclusively by compliant 
participants. On the other hand, the probability of getting sanctioned, social norms and morals 
and values were used by both compliant and noncompliant participants as well as both 
competitive and noncompetitive participants. 
 
 
Figure 31. Reasoning based on theoretical framework 
 
If we take the events of receiving news in the pilot experiment as reasons and the threshold of 
at least 2 participants in a cluster to react to an event with noncompliance, then we can see the 
following patterns emerge (see Figure 32). Naturally, noncompliant participants had more 
reasons for noncompliance than compliant participants. Passing inspection, getting sanctioned 
and seeing that the other player got sanctioned were all used as a reason for noncompliance by 
noncompliant participants. However, competitive noncompliant participants also used the fact 
that they got away with illegal logging as a reason for noncompliance. This difference might 
be informative of a strategical difference between noncompliant participants that is driven by 
motivation. In particular, getting away with illegal logging inspired risk seeking behavior in 
competitive participants and risk averse behavior in noncompetitive participants.  
 
Last, some insights emerged regarding the role of social norms emerged from quantitative data 
(see Appendix 7). Namely, participants logged illegally more often when both they and the 
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other players got sanctioned compared to when they were the only ones sanctioned. Moreover, 
there was more noncompliance when they passed inspection compared to when they passed 
inspection and received notice that one of the other players has been sanctioned. In other words, 
the additional news that someone else has been sanctioned increases compliance when 
participants have passed inspection and decreases compliance when participants have gotten 
sanctioned. The indication from this is that seeing other people get sanctioned reinforces the 
participants’ original strategy. Thus, social norms, as a reason for compliance, should not only 
be understood as information about what the other players are doing, but rather as individual 
decision-making in relation to decision-making by others in the group.   
 
Notwithstanding, these results should be received with caution, as they are merely preliminary 
results of a pilot experiment. Firmer inferences about the meaning of this data can be made 
with a full-scale experiment.  
 
 
Figure 32. Reasoning for noncompliance according to news notifications 
 
8.2 Theoretical implications 
One of the theoretical implications from this research is a confirmation of the complexity of 
the issue of compliance. While earlier works (Becker, 1968) understood compliance as a result 
of utilitarian calculations, this research is more in line with contemporary studies that 
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2013). The following comments describe the knowledge contribution of this thesis in relation 
to comparable works. 
 
To begin with, Xepapadeas (2005) used modeling to show the possibility of a steady-state 
equilibrium consisting of both cooperative and non-cooperative behavior. The pilot experiment 
revealed two strategies analogous to this: compliant and noncompliant behavior. Further, 
aggregate compliance level statistics showed stable-like behavior at around 80% of participants 
complying (see Figure 18) in any given round, which is supportive of that proposition. 
 
Harvey, Bell & Birjulin (1993) found that punishment had an influence on compliant behavior 
while feedback about the state of the resource pool did not. This was confirmed by the pilot 
experiment as very few participants mentioned that they actively took the forest cover into 
account when making decisions, while the majority reasoned about the possibility of getting 
sanctioned.  
 
Anderson & Stafford (2003) found that sanction severity, or the penalty level, was more 
influential to compliance compared to the probability of getting sanctioned. The results of the 
pilot experiment provided additional explanations for that finding as participants who viewed 
the penalty level as too high did not engage in estimating the probability of getting sanctioned, 
suggesting that the perception of illegal gain is what leads to the probability of being sanctioned 
being used as a reason to justify decisions. Further, they found that past sanctions increased 
noncompliance, however this was not the case in the pilot experiment. Generally, participants 
complied as a response to getting sanctioned, with a few exceptions of participants with a 
noncompliant strategy. The interviews also revealed that although past sanctions would 
sometimes inspire further noncompliance, this effect was eliminated with the second sanction.  
 
Cardenas (2004) found that social norms are more influential to compliance compared to the 
penalty level. The pilot experiment was supportive of this finding because the penalty level 
was not mentioned as often as the behavior of others when participants reasoned through their 
decisions. Moreover, other scholars (Baerlein, Kasymov & Zikos, 2015; Hatcher, Jaffry, 
Thebaus & Bennett, 2000; Tavoni, Schulter & Levin, 2011; Janssen, Bousquet, Cardenas, 
Castillo & Worrampimphong, 2013) have emphasized social norms as an important predictor 
of compliance. As an example, Rodriguez-Sickert, Guzmán & Cárdenas (2008) found that 
social norms were most influential in situations where there was a lack of enforcement. The 
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pilot experiment captured a situation where there is enforcement and the social norm was 
represented through the recipience of news whether someone else has been sanctioned. There 
was a higher incidence of noncompliance after participants received a notification that both 
they and the other player got sanctioned compared to when they were the only ones sanctioned. 
Similarly, there was a lower incidence of noncompliance when players received a notification 
that the other player got sanctioned in addition to passing inspection, compared to just passing 
inspection. The resulting insight from this is that social norms have a more complex 
relationship with enforcement mechanisms.  
 
Chaudhuri (2011) found that a large group of public good experiments participants are 
“conditional cooperators’, which is to say that they cooperate only when they know that others 
are cooperating too. This is analogous to the participants found to have a competitive strategy 
in the pilot experiment, which is to say that they were driven by the development of the score 
which allowed them to compare themselves to the behavior of others.  
 
Bouriaud (2005) concluded that poverty is a significant driver of illegal logging. Comparative 
to this, the pilot experiment showed that the most commonly used reason for noncompliance 
was the illegal gain in terms of demand, supporting Bouriaud’s finding.   
 
Considering Ostrom’s seven broad types of governance rules for the commons (see Table 1), 
this thesis illuminated some insights about the effect of information rules on compliance in 
public forests. Specifically, it found that the forest cover has little to no effect on compliance, 
while information about others has an effect on compliance. Choice rules, or rather the gap 
between quota and demand, was expressed in participant reasoning but no such pattern was 
identifiable in the quantitative data. Payoff rules, or the scoring mechanism in the simulation 
game was found to be influential in participant decision-making, although no precise 
conclusions about the exact way the scoring mechanism influences compliance can be drawn 
from the pilot experiment.  
 
Moreover, the results from the pilot experiment confirmed the hypothesis on the misperception 
of bioeconomics (Moxnes, 2000). The evidence from this is that some participants logged 
below the quota, expecting to see an increase in forest cover, while not taking into account the 
inherent delays, nonlinear growth function or the behavior of others.  
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Last, some insights emerged regarding the participants’ attitude to the uncertain probability of 
getting sanctioned. They reasoned about the probability of getting monitored either by referring 
to gut feeling, heuristics or Bayes-like calculations. Thus, the contribution of this thesis is that 
a simulation game like the one described here can be used to study compliance in behavioral 
economics. Moreover, many participants referred to the score as a reference point in their 
decision-making, reasoning that they were risk averse when they had a negative score and risk-
seeking when they had a positive score.  They further explained that they had switched to being 
risk averse once they had achieved what they deemed as a sufficient score. These findings from 
the interview point toward a potential application of prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1986) for studying compliance behavior.  
 
8.3 Practical implications 
Understanding reasoning behind compliance is of tremendous significance not only to national 
forest industries, but also to transnational initiatives like UN REDD+ projects or European 
Union’s FLEGT Action Plan. Some recommendations can be made to public forests that are 
experiencing increases in demand for wood products and decreases in the allowable annual cut 
due to environmental regulation, while at the same time dealing with detrimental 
noncompliance levels or transitioning from a forest without a management plan to a forest with 
a management plan.   
 
Namely, the recommendations are regarding the tradeoff between investment in enforcement 
regulation or investment in strategies to influence the social norm and governance process 
legitimacy. The former can provide short-term improvement results, while the latter helps 
maintain long-term results. Therefore, it is recommended that the focus be on enforcement 
rather than social projects in cases where noncompliance is high. This can be done through 
decreasing potential illegal gains, increasing the penalty level or improving the effectiveness 
of monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms. In cases where capacity for enforcement is low, or 
noncompliance is not at an alarmingly high level, it is recommended to invest in governance 
transparency and stimulating participation in the governance process. Specifically, this 
research showed the importance of stimulating a positive social norm through publication of 
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8.4 Methodological contribution 
Chapter 5 outlines the development of an online system dynamics simulation game for the 
purpose of conducting research. Notably, Moxnes (2000) has developed simulators, while 
Sterman (1987) and Lara-Arango (2018) have developed games for the purpose of 
experimental research. However, their game development process has not been explicitly 
outlined. Thus, the game development methodology described in Chapter 5 had no precedent.  
In my experience game development shared many similarities with model development. 
Specifically, both required: (1) the identification of purpose and time-bound context, (2) 
explicit assumptions, (3) testing, (4) calibration and (5) behavior analysis. In addition to this, 
game development necessitated the creation of (1) an imaginary context, (2) player roles, (3) 
game rules, (4) incentive structure and an (5) interactive interface. I found the work of Bots & 
van Daalen (2007) particularly helpful as it helped me include all the elements that modified 
the model into a game (see Table 3). Thus, this thesis has contributed towards the marriage 
between system dynamics and serious gaming. 
 
The difference between a game for learning and a game for research in terms of methodology 
is that games for learning place more emphasis on debriefing and game facilitation, while 
games for research are focused on behavior analysis. Section 5.10 was crucial for me to build 
expectations about participant behavior, which served as a reference point for conducting my 
analysis and fulfilling my research purpose. All in all, this thesis sets the stage for the 
development of a methodology for designing simulation games based off system dynamics 
models for the specific purpose of experimental research. 
 
Further, I used a pilot experiment as a research method. Pilot experiments are a mixed method 
as they incorporate the analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data. My inspiration for 
using this particular method was based on Jensen & Brehmer (2003) and it proved as a great 
method for studying participant reasoning. Specifically, the process of cross-referencing 
qualitative and quantitative data allowed me to derive powerful insights through better 
understanding what participants thought about and how that translated into their specific 
decisions. While the resulting insights from this research do not hold any statistical 
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8.5 Limitations   
By design, simulation games are a form of argument by analogy. In other words, the game is 
intended to serve as an analogy of the real-world system. Thus, any conclusions drawn from 
research using the game is used as a base to infer insights about real world behavior should be 
received with caution. However useful, arguments by analogy are flawed. The reason for this 
can be interpreted through Kahneman’s theory of the dichotomy between fast and slow thought 
(2011). Decision-making in the pilot experiment takes from seconds to minutes, while, in the 
real world, that decision can take from a week to a year. Hence, while decision-making in 
simulation games can mimic situations that require thinking “fast”, it might not do as good of 
a job replicating situations where thinking is “slow”.   
 
Another important limitation of this research is that it failed to include income reliance as a 
cause for noncompliance, even though there has been research highlighting its importance 
(Madrigal-Ballestero et al., 2013). Arguably, income reliance is represented through illegal gain 
in the theoretical framework, however the illegal gains in this game did not correspond to 
illegal gains in the real world. In fact, participation in the pilot experiment was completely 
voluntary, so participants had nothing significant to win or lose, apart from a mere notification 
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Appendix 1: Model documentation 
The model has been documented according to the preferred model reporting guidelines outlined 
by Rahmandad and Sterman (2012).  See Table 11. 
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Table 11. Model documentation 
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Appendix 2: Sensitivity analysis 
 
Overview 
I conducted sensitivity analysis on the model (see Figure 33). Starting from a position of 
equilibrium, I varied all exogenous variables from +20% to -20% of their equilibrium value. 
Out of all exogenous variables, the following proved sensitive:  
• Reference growth rate 
• Maximum forest area 
• INIT Desired allowable annual cut 
 
Model sensitivity appears whenever the system is pushed out of equilibrium. In fact, all model 
reactions can be understood as tendencies of the model to bring itself back into a state of 
equilibrium. Thus, the conclusion from this sensitivity analysis is that the model is robust and 
dominated by balancing loops B2 and B3.  
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Reference growth rate 
The model was sensitive to changes in Reference growth rate (see Figure 34). When I changed 
the growth rate to a value higher than the equilibrium value, then Allowable annual cut 
increased. Whereas, the Allowable annual cut decreased when I changed the growth rate to a 
value lower than the equilibrium value. The response was not immediate because of the long 
delay time (Desired allowable annual cut adjustment time). This sensitivity is due to the 
balancing loops (B2 and B3) which work to maintain the system in equilibrium. Hence, they 
push the Allowable annual cut in the same direction as the growth rate.   
 
 
Figure 34. Change in Allowable annual cut when Reference growth is changed from its equilibrium value 
 
Maximum forest area 
The model showed sensitivity to changes in Maximum forest area (see Figure 35). Namely, the 
Allowable annual cut responded by moving in the same direction as the change in Maximum 
forest area. Whenever Maximum forest area increased, so too did the Allowable annual cut and 
vice versa. Similar to the sensitivity to the Reference growth rate described above, the response 
of Allowable annual cut is not immediate because of the delay time (Desired allowable annual 
cut). This sensitivity can be understood in terms of the wood removal regulation loops (B2 and 
B3), which move the system towards an equilibrium. Essentially, the response of the Allowable 
annual cut to changes in Maximum forest area is due to the goal of these loops, which is to 
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Figure 35. Change in Allowable annual cut when Maximum forest area is changed from its equilibrium value 
 
INIT Desired allowable annual cut 
Very similar to the cases describes above, the model is reactive to slight changes in INIT 
Desired allowable annual cut (see Figure 36). These changes are a result of B2 and B3, i.e. the 
system’s tendency to go toward an equilibrium. 
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Appendix 3: Game equations 
 
Incentive sector 
Demand[Player] = Individual_quota/0.75 
    UNITS: m3/year 
Increase_in_demand[Player] = Demand*Fractional_demand_growth_rate  
            UNITS: m3/year/Year 
Fractional_demand_growth_rate = 0.01 
    UNITS: unitless/year 
 
Monitoring sector 
is_monitored[Player] = IF uniform_probability_distribution >= probability_of_being_monitored 
THEN 0 ELSE 1 
uniform_probability_distribution[Player] = UNIFORM(0, 1, 1) 
    UNITS: unitless 
probability_of_being_monitored[Player] = 0.5 
    UNITS: unitless 
 
Sanctioning sector 
Executed_sanctions[Player](t) = Executed_sanctions[Player](t - dt) + (Sanctions_in_process[Player]) * 
dt 
    INIT Executed_sanctions[Player] = 0 
    UNITS: points 
Sanctions_in_process[Player] = IF (is_sanctioned=1) AND (TIME MOD 3=1) THEN (1) ELSE (0) 
{UNIFLOW} 
            UNITS: points/year 
is_sanctioned[Player] = IF (is_monitored=1) AND (is_cheating=1) THEN (1) ELSE (0) 
    UNITS: unitless 
Cumulative_losses_from_sanctions[Player](t) = Cumulative_losses_from_sanctions[Player](t - dt) + 
(Increase_in_losses_from_sanctions[Player]) * dt 
    INIT Cumulative_losses_from_sanctions[Player] = 0 
    UNITS: points 
Increase_in_losses_from_sanctions[Player] = IF (is_sanctioned=1) AND (TIME MOD 3=1)THEN 
(Points_from_sanctioning) ELSE (0)  
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Scoring sector 
Cumulative_Score[Player](t) = Cumulative_Score[Player](t - dt) + (Change_of_score[Player]) * dt 
    INIT Cumulative_Score[Player] = 0 
    UNITS: points 
Change_of_score[Player] = IF (TIME MOD 3=1) THEN (Score) ELSE (0) 
            UNITS: points/year 
Points_from_sanctioning[Player] = Demand*Points_converter 
    UNITS: points/year 
Points_from_satisfying_demand[Player] = (IF (actual_extraction_level>Demand) THEN (Demand) 
ELSE (actual_extraction_level-unsatisfied_demand))*Points_converter 
    UNITS: points/year 
Score[Player] = IF (is_sanctioned=1) THEN (-Points_from_sanctioning) ELSE 
(Points_from_satisfying_demand) 
    UNITS: points/year 
Points_converter = 1 
    UNITS: points/m3 
unsatisfied_demand[Player] = MAX (0, Demand-actual_extraction_level) 
    UNITS: m3/year 
 
Model modifications 
Individual_quota[Player] = ROUND(Allowable_annual_cut/SIZE(actual_extraction_level)) 
    UNITS: m3/year 
actual_extraction_level[Player] = IF (is_active=1) THEN (extraction_level) ELSE 
(automated_player_extraction_level) 
    UNITS: m3/year 
extraction_level[Player] =83 
    UNITS: m3/year 
automated_player_extraction_level = extraction_level[Player_1] 
    UNITS: m3/year 
  Wood_removal = MIN(Growing_stock/DT, SUM(actual_extraction_level)) {UNIFLOW} 
            UNITS: m3/year 
is_active[Player] = 0 
    UNITS: unitless 
 
Game controls 
game_advanced = IF (TIME MOD 3=1) THEN (1) ELSE (0) 
    UNITS: unitless 
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    DOCUMENT: AND (game_over=0) AND (TIME>1980)  
game_over = IF (STOPTIME - TIME < DT) THEN (1) ELSE (0) 
    UNITS: unitless 
is_cheating[Player] = IF ((actual_extraction_level-Individual_quota)>1) THEN (1) ELSE (0) 
    UNITS: unitless 
last_cumulative_score[Player] = HISTORY (Cumulative_Score,  TIME-2) 
    UNITS: points 
last_demand[Player] = HISTORY(Demand,  TIME-2) 
    UNITS: m3/year 
last_extraction_level[Player] = HISTORY (actual_extraction_level,  TIME-2) 
    UNITS: m3/year 
last_individual_quota[Player] = HISTORY(Individual_quota,  TIME-3) 
    UNITS: m3/year 
last_points_from_sanctioning[Player] = HISTORY(Points_from_sanctioning,  TIME-2) 
    UNITS: points/year 
last_score[Player] = HISTORY(Score,  TIME-2) 
    UNITS: points/year 
last_unsatisfied_demand[Player] = HISTORY(unsatisfied_demand,  TIME-2) 
    UNITS: m3/year 
no_news[Player] = IF (other_was_sanctioned=0)  AND (was_sanctioned=0) AND 
(passed_inspection=0) AND (was_not_sanctioned=0) OR (TIME=1980) THEN (1) ELSE (0) 
    UNITS: unitless 
other_was_sanctioned[Player_1] = IF (was_sanctioned[Player_2]=1) OR 
(was_sanctioned[Player_3]=1)THEN (1) ELSE (0) 
    UNITS: unitless 
other_was_sanctioned[Player_2] = IF (was_sanctioned[Player_1]) OR 
(was_sanctioned[Player_3]=1)THEN (1) ELSE (0) 
    UNITS: unitless 
other_was_sanctioned[Player_3] = IF (was_sanctioned[Player_2]=1) OR 
(was_sanctioned[Player_1]=1) THEN (1) ELSE (0) 
    UNITS: unitless 
    UNITS: unitless 
passed_inspection[Player] = IF (was_monitored=1) AND (was_sanctioned=0) THEN (1) ELSE (0) 
    UNITS: unitless 
satisfy[Player] = IF (did_not_satisfy_demand=0) THEN (1) ELSE (0) 
    UNITS: unitless 
was_monitored[Player] = IF (HISTORY(is_monitored,  TIME-2)=1) THEN (1) ELSE (0) 
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    UNITS: unitless 
was_not_sanctioned[Player] = IF (cheated=1) AND (was_monitored=0) THEN (1) ELSE (0) 
    UNITS: unitless 
was_sanctioned[Player] = IF (was_monitored=1) AND (cheated=1) THEN (1) ELSE (0) 
    UNITS: unitless 
winner_notification[Player_1] = IF (Cumulative_Score[Player_2]<Cumulative_Score[Player_1]) 
AND (Cumulative_Score[Player_3]<Cumulative_Score[Player_1]) THEN (1) ELSE (0) 
    UNITS: unitless 
winner_notification[Player_2] = IF (Cumulative_Score[Player_1]<Cumulative_Score[Player_2]) 
AND (Cumulative_Score[Player_3]<Cumulative_Score[Player_2]) THEN (1) ELSE (0) 
    UNITS: unitless 
winner_notification[Player_3] = IF (Cumulative_Score[Player_1]<Cumulative_Score[Player_3]) 
AND (Cumulative_Score[Player_2]<Cumulative_Score[Player_3]) THEN (1) ELSE (0) 
    UNITS: unitless 
did_not_satisfy_demand[Player] = IF (last_unsatisfied_demand>0) AND (was_sanctioned=0) THEN 
(1) ELSE (0) 
    UNITS: unitless 
even_match[Player] = IF ((Cumulative_Score[Player_2]-Cumulative_Score[Player_1])=0) THEN (1) 
ELSE (0) 
    UNITS: unitless 
cheated[Player] = IF (HISTORY(is_cheating,  TIME-2)=1) THEN (1) ELSE (0) 
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Appendix 4: Game instructions 
 
Welcome to the logging game. This game is intended to recreate a situation in which a group 
makes decisions about the use of a forest.  
 
It is 1980 in the region of Treezonia and you are a local logging company, Woodpecker ltd. 
You have a difficult task at hand: to satisfy Treezonians' demand for wood and, at the same 
time, abide by the government's quota for logging wood. 
 
Each round you have to make a decision about how much you will log and receive points for 
past performance. Rounds take place every 3 years, so you will make a decision every 3 years. 
There are 13 rounds representing the progression from 1980 to 2019. 
 
You receive 1 point for every cubic meter (m3) of demand you manage to satisfy. There are no 
extra points for logging more than the demand. But, there are negative points (-1 point) for 
every cubic meter (m3) of demand you do not satisfy. 
 
Sometimes the demand for wood may be higher than the legal quota, which may tempt you to 
log more than is allowed. Be careful, you will get sanctioned if you get caught! As a sanction, 
the government will take away all your logged wood and you will not be able to meet any 
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Appendix 5: Consent form 
Consent form 
 
I volunteer to participate in a research project conducted by Ema Gusheva, from University of 
Bergen. I understand that the project is designed to gather information for academic purposes.  
 
My participation in this project is voluntary. I understand that I will not be paid for my 
participation. I may withdraw and discontinue participation at any time without penalty.   
 
I give permission to be audio-recorded during the interview. 
 
I understand that I will not be identified by name in any report using information obtained from 
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Appendix 6: Interview guide 
 
Introduction 
Thank you for volunteering to participate in this pilot experiment and thank you for signing the 
consent form. I want to remind you that you do not have to answer my questions if they make 
you feel uncomfortable. You are also free to leave at any time. As was written in the consent 
form, some of your statement may be quoted in my research, but it will be anonymous, so 
confidentiality is maintained.  
 
Questions 
1. Can you describe your experience of playing the game? 
 
2. What was your reaction to these events in the game? and why?  
 … changes in demand?  
 … change in quota? 
 … changes in score? 
 … changes in forest area? 
 … getting sanctioned? 
 … passing inspection?  
 … getting away with illegal logging? 
 … receiving news about the other player getting sanctioned? 
 … no news? 
 
3. Overall, how would you describe your strategy in the game? 
 
4. What was your main motivation to adopt this particular strategy? 
 
Closing Remarks 
Thank you so much for contributing to me research. It has been very insightful. I would be 
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Appendix 7: Incidence of illegal logging  
Figure 37 presents the extent of illegal logging of each participant in each round color coded 
according to the type of news displayed on the interface. See Figure 38 for the color code 
legend. It is clear (see Figure 39) that the highest incidence of illegal logging occurred when 
participants were notified that they have gotten away with illegal logging (shown in blue), 
while the lowest incidence was when they passed inspection and the other player got sanctioned 
(shown in orange).  
 
 
Figure 37. Extent of illegal logging per participant color-coded according to the type of news displayed in each round 
 
 
Figure 38. Color code legend 
 
 
Figure 39. Incidence of illegal logging according to news display 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
1 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 0.3 0 1 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 1 0 0.4 0 1 0 0
3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 1 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.1 0 1 0 0
6 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 1 0 0 0 0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0.4 0 0 0 0.1 1 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 1 0 0.1 0 1 0 0
9 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 1 0.2 0 0 0 0
10 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0
11 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
12 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0
13 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Extent of illegal logging per participant
Rounds
A There are no news this round
B Phew! The forest police did not monitor your lot this round. You got away with illegal logging!
C Nice going! The forest police monitored your lot and found no signs of illegal logging. 
D You have been sanctioned for cutting wood illegally. The forest police took your all your logging away and you are not able to meet any of the demands from this round.
You have been sanctioned for cutting wood illegally. The forest police took your all your logging away and you are not able to meet any of the demands from this 
round. One of the other players was monitored by the forest police and found guilty of illegal logging. All the wood has been retrieved and they have been 
Nice going! The forest police monitored your lot and found no signs of illegal logging. One of the other players was monitored by the forest police and found 
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Incidence of illegal logging
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Appendix 8: Coding according to theoretical framework 
The qualitative data was coded deductively using the theoretical framework described in 
Chapter 2. See Table 12.  The results of this coding procedure are described in Chapter 7. 
 






I didn’t know how often I got monitored. I tried to get a sense of it, but I 
couldn’t hack that. 
I didn’t know how often the police intervened. 
If I had a way of knowing when I would get monitored, then I would have 
risked more. But I thought it was random, so there was no point in 
cheating. 
I got caught when I only overstepped by 1 and didn’t get caught when I 
overstepped by 60. That didn’t make sense to me. 
I tried to guess when I would be monitored by the government and 
deceive the system. It was mostly intuitive. 
I anticipated the probability of getting caught based on gut instinct, not 
calculations. I would wait for the police to monitor 3 times before I 
cheated. 
I would try to cheat right after I got monitored. 
I didn’t think the police monitored in 2 consecutive rounds. 
I thought that the amount I log illegally is connected to the probability of 
getting monitored. 
Seeing others get sanctioned helped me figure out the probability of 
getting monitored the next round. 
I thought that there was a connection between how much you overstep the 
quota and whether you got monitored. Reading that the others got 
sanctioned made me question how much they went overboard. 
I started calculating a little bit. I thought that I wouldn’t get checked twice 
in a row.   
I thought that monitoring was either done randomly or connected to the 
amount I log. In fact, once I overstepped by a lot just to see if monitoring 
is connected to the amount I log. I got caught, so it confirmed my 
suspicion. I didn’t want to cheat in the end of the game when the gap was 
biggest because I believed that that’s when I have the biggest chance of 
being monitored. 
I thought that the chances of getting caught are really high, almost certain. 
Penalty level If you break the rules all the logs will be taken away. 
I thought the sanction was too high. I could cheat but the return wasn’t 
worth it. 
It didn’t matter if I logged below the quota, as long as I didn’t lose my 
logs because of the sanctioned. 
Illegal gain There was only one round in which I cheated (quota error) because I 
thought that the payoff was worth it. 
The increasing demand motivated me to cheat later on in the game 
(middle) in order to get more points as a result of cheating. 
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 I was wondering if the government’s quota was properly calculated or is it 
was less than what is sustainable. I was wondering if the government’s 
quota was properly calculated or is it was less than what is sustainable. 
The laws are there for a reason – to protect the environment. 
I thought that logging according to the quota is sustainable. The 
government must have calculated it. So, we should respect it. 
Social norm Our generation grew up playing games whose whole point was to cheat 
the rules you had. 
I realized that unethical behavior would happen regardless of my actions.  
Seeing that the other player got sanctioned further reinforced my ambition 
to log very little.   
If there had been news that other players were abiding by the quota, then 
that would have motivated me to abide by the quota too. 
I felt good to hear that the other player got sanctioned, especially if I got 
sanctioned that round too. It was good that I wasn’t the only one losing 
points.  
Reading that the other players got sanctioned prompted me to cheat again. 
It felt ok to cheat because the competition was also doing it. 
Morals and 
values 
I thought that that’s what a law-abiding citizen would do. It is not in my 
nature to be a criminal and cheat. 
I tried to rationalize and do what I do mostly in life, which is to follow the 
legal quota. I believe in the system and the value of having jurisdiction. I 
felt like I owed it to myself and the legal system to abide by the rules. My 
instinct is to follow rules. 
I tried to abide by the rules not only because of the fact that they are rules, 
but also because of the environment. 
The reason I abided by the law is because I would do that in real life. In 
general, I don’t take risks when it comes to the law. 
I didn’t look at the tree cover because it made me uncomfortable. I don’t 
like being the bad guy. 
There were two choices: either to do what is right or to do what is 
required. 
I tried to use a conservative approach because it is ethical to do so. I 
didn’t feel comfortable overstepping the quota. 
I didn’t want to be greedy. 
If the forest is what I am making profit off I shouldn’t risk that being 
taken away from me in the long-term. 
I wanted to aim for sustainability. 
I wanted to spare the forest. 
I want there to be enough forest to maintain wildlife. 
I tried to abide by the rules not only because of the fact that they are rules, 
but also because of the environment. 
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Appendix 9: Coding according to interface 
First, the themes were created according to the interface and the interview guide. Next, the 
qualitative data was coded according to the themes. At the end, inductive coding was applied 
within each theme, highlighting emerging patterns in the data (see Table 13). The results of 
this coding procedure are described in Chapter 7. 
 
Theme Code Example of paraphrased verbal statement 
Effect of 
sanction 
Compliance Getting caught made me think that the police is keeping an eye on me, so I 
just stuck with the quota in the next round. 
Once I got a penalty, I was sure that I was never going to overstep again 
I responded to getting sanctioned by complying. 
Getting caught made me comply.   
Whenever I got caught, I started complying. 
When I got sanctioned it made me comply. 
Getting sanctioned made me angry. It immediately made me comply. 
Getting sanctioned motivated me to comply. 
My reaction to getting sanctioned was to comply. 
Noncompliance Getting sanctioned motivated me to cheat again. 
I was not convinced by the first sanction, it made me think I wouldn’t get 
sanctioned twice in a row. 
Effect of getting 
sanctioned twice 
The second sanction was convincing, and I decided to comply. 
Getting sanctioned multiple times pushed me to comply. 




If you break the rules all the logs will be taken away. 
I thought the sanction was too high. I could cheat but the return wasn’t 
worth it. 
It didn’t matter if I logged below the quota, as long as I didn’t lose my logs 




Rewarding I liked passing inspection because it reinforced my strategy. 
Passing inspection felt rewarding so it motivated me to comply. 
Passing inspection and reading that others got sanctioned made me comply. 
If I hadn’t received notifications that I passed inspection, then I would 
probably cheat more. 
Calculating Passing inspection informed my intuitive guess about the monitoring 
frequency. 
Passing inspection motivated me to cheat in the next round 
Passing inspection motivated me to cheat because I thought that I wouldn’t 
get checked twice in a row.   






Feeling lucky When I got away with illegal logging, I thought it was plain luck. It made 
me cheat in the next round. 
I once cheated accidentally (quota error), but that only made me more 
careful to comply. 
Getting away with cheating made me feel lucky and inspired me to comply. 
I had one sneaky success in cheating and then that motivated me to comply. 
Whenever I got away with cheating, I got the sinking feeling that my luck 
wouldn’t last, so I resorted to compliance. 
 
 
- 103 - 
After getting away with it I didn’t want to continue cheating. It was enough 
for me. 
Getting away with illegal logging gives you a sense of success. But I didn’t 
cheat in the next round. 
When I won (got away with illegal logging) once I felt satisfied and that 
motivated me to comply in the next round. 
Encouraged to 
cheat 
When I got away with illegal logging, I thought it was plain luck. It made 
me cheat in the next round. 
When I got away with illegal logging it motivated me to cheat more. 
Getting away with illegal logging made me think that I can meet the 
demand. 










Frustrated by increasing gap. It would be hard to survive the year like that.  
The increasing gap made the game more difficult and tempted me to cheat, 
but I didn’t. 
The increasing gap made it more difficult to obtain points by complying, so 
it pushed me to cheat. When you have lost so much you risk even more. 
The increasing gap assured me that it is better to cheat later on in the game, 
but I didn’t. 
The increasing gap was frustrating. It encouraged me to cheat in order to 
get points. 
The increasing gap made me more desperate to cheat. 
The increasing demand motivated me to cheat later on in the game (middle) 
in order to get more points as a result of cheating. 
My reaction to the increasing gap was to log illegally. 
The increasing gap guided my decision as I mostly tried to get a positive 





My decisions weren’t connected to the increasing gap. 
I understood that there was a tension between quota and demand, but it was 
always quite high, so I didn’t respond. 
I didn’t care much about the demand. I also didn’t care about the 
decreasing trend in the quota. 
 I wasn’t influenced by changing demand. It would have had a bigger 
reaction if the demand had risen more aggressively. 
 Increasing demand didn’t influence me. 
Focus on quota The payoffs didn’t influence my decision. I didn’t even pay attention to the 
demand, only to the quota. 
I mostly focused on what I could log – quota. I didn’t think about the 
payoffs. 
I didn’t care about the demand. I just went for how much I could take. 
Focus on 
demand 
I felt like people were waiting for me to provide. I just wanted to meet the 
demand no matter what. 
Justifying 
demand increase 
I was wondering whether logging more than the quota had some effect on 
the demand. In the real world the increasing gap must be though, but I 
suspect it would still be profitable. 
I wondered if rising demand is connected to the fact that I got caught. 
The increasing gap felt unfair. I felt forced to lose points, but I also felt that 
I had enough points by then. I was hopeful that the quota would increase.   
Effect of 
score 
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I wasn’t influenced by the score because I didn’t feel like I was competing 
with anyone. 
I didn’t know what the score meant so I didn’t base my decisions on it. 
Effect of 
negative score 
When I lost most of the points it motivated me to gamble less and stick 
with the quota. 
I was getting less points, but my score was still positive, so there wasn’t a 
huge incentive to cheat. 
Having a negative score made me want to get a positive score through more 
aggressive behavior (compliant behavior) 
When I got sanctioned with negative points I tried to compensate by 
cheating. I guess this a spiral where having a negative score makes you 
cheat, which further makes you have negative points. After complying for 
several rounds and building up a positive score (which I thought were 
enough) I tried cheating again. 
Having a negative score influenced me to comply. 
Getting a negative score made me comply. I didn’t want a negative score. 
Having a negative score made me comply. 
Having a negative score motivated me to comply. 
Effect of positive 
score 
At first, I wanted to keep my score positive by staying close to the quota, 
but then I switched focus and disregarded the score. 
When my score rose, I tried to keep it high by complying. 
It was important for me to maintain a positive score. I mostly tried to get a 







I only looked at the forest cover twice, but I didn’t notice changes. If I had 
noticed a drastic change in the forest cover, then that would have 
influenced my decision. 
I didn’t pay attention to the forest area and didn’t notice any change there. 
I didn’t see any change there 
I looked at the forest cover, but I didn’t notice a change. 
I paid attention to the forest cover. I expected that it would change but it 
didn’t. 




I didn’t take into account the forest area. 
The forest area did not influence my decision. 
I wasn’t affected by the forest area. 
I didn’t look at the tree cover. It made me feel uncomfortable. 
I didn’t look at the forest cover. I was caught up in the numbers. 
I didn’t look at the forest cover. 
I didn’t look at the forest cover.   
I didn’t take the forest cover into account when making decisions.   
Confusion about 
forest cover 
I looked at the forest cover and wondered how exactly that is connected to 
the quota. 
I didn’t look at the forest cover. I didn’t understand what it meant.   
Reactive  I was mostly looking at the forest cover. The drop motivated me to further 
log below the quota. 
The forest cover went down, so I thought that it is better to log less. 
I thought that it is important to watch the forest cover to get a sense of the 
logging level of the other players. 
 
 






than the other 
I was happy to receive news that others got sanctioned and it informed my 
choice about whether to cheat or not. It stopped me from my desire to 
cheat. 
It made me feel better than them and thus tempted me to cheat more, but I 
didn’t act on it. 
I felt a weird sense of satisfaction when I received a notification that the 
other person got sanctioned. It made me feel like I had the upper hand. 
Knowing that other got sanctioned made me feel better about myself. 
I was happy when the other player got caught. 




Reading about the other player reminded me that it is a competition, so I 
had to do well. It brought me hope that I might win. I compared the number 
of times the other player got sanctioned and compared it to the number of 
times I got sanctioned. 
Seeing that other had gotten sanctioned tempted me to cheat. I was 
wondering if I was going to lose because of this. 
When I read that others got sanctioned made me feel watched, but I still 
logged illegally after that. 
Adaptive Seeing that the other player got sanctioned further reinforced my ambition 
to log very little.   
If there had been news that other players were abiding by the quota, then 
that would have motivated me to abide by the quota too. 
Caution Reading that the other player got sanctioned reminded me not to take more 
than I am allowed to. 
Reading the news about other made me especially careful to comply. 
Reading that the other player got sanctioned motivated me to comply. 
Reading that the other player got caught made me more careful to comply. 
No influence Seeing that the other player got sanctioned didn’t influence me. 
I wasn’t influenced by others. 
Information about the others didn’t compel me to cheat. 
Feeling 
comforted 
I felt good to hear that the other player got sanctioned, especially if I got 
sanctioned that round too. It was good that I wasn’t the only one losing 
points.  
Reading that the other players got sanctioned prompted me to cheat again. 
It felt ok to cheat because the competition was also doing it. 
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Appendix 10: Axial coding 
The qualitative data was coded inductively for the purpose of identifying codes and themes 
that are not captured through the other coding framework. First, the data was coded openly, 
creating a set of open codes. At the same time, I noted some interconnections between these 
open codes in the form of axial codes (see Table 14). The results of this coding procedure are 
described in Chapter 7. 
 




Playing it safe In the first year I was obeying the rules until I got upset when the quota 
fell, and demand rose. 
At the beginning I just wanted to stick with the quota. 
At first, I followed the rules in order to get a sense of the frequency of 
monitoring. 
At first, I was going by the book in order to learn the mechanics of the 
game. 
I started complying with the quota in order to see how the game worked. 
Experimenting In the begging I logged as low as possible in order to see if the forest 
cover would increase. 
I started gambling immediately. 
I started gambling immediately to get a sense of the mechanism of the 
game. 
I started with lower than the quota just to see if the forest cover would 





I expected the quota would be higher or the same as last year, especially 
since I was following the quota in the first years. 
I looked at the score and I wondered why I am getting lower points for 
making the right decision. 
Expectation of 
impact 
I also got discouraged that my actions to log less than the quota did not 
have the desired impact of increasing the forest cover. 
I logged less than the legal quota twice to see whether the forest cover 
would change but it didn’t. 
I was disappointed to see that the forest cover decreased despite the fact 
that I was logging below the quota. 
I wanted to see if the forest cover would increase if I logged below the 
quota. It didn’t. 
Attitude to 





I felt that I should cheat at least once (as an adventure). 
I cheated once just to see what would happen. 
No opinion I didn’t think about the probability of getting monitored. 
I didn’t bother with this because I thought the sanction was too high. 
Intuitive I tried to guess when I would be monitored by the government and 
deceive the system. It was mostly intuitive. 
I anticipated the probability of getting caught based on gut instinct, not 




I would try to cheat right after I got monitored. 
I didn’t think the police monitored in 2 consecutive rounds. 
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I thought that the amount I log illegally is connected to the probability 
of getting monitored. 
Seeing others get sanctioned helped me figure out the probability of 
getting monitored the next round. 
I thought that there was a connection between how much you overstep 
the quota and whether you got monitored. Reading that the others got 
sanctioned made me question how much they went overboard. 
I started calculating a little bit. I thought that I wouldn’t get checked 
twice in a row.   
I thought that monitoring was either done randomly or connected to the 
amount I log. In fact, once I overstepped by a lot just to see if 
monitoring is connected to the amount I log. I got caught, so it 
confirmed my suspicion. I didn’t want to cheat in the end of the game 
when the gap was biggest because I believed that that’s when I have the 
biggest chance of being monitored. 










I thought that the amount I log illegally is connected to the probability 
of getting monitored. 
I thought that there was a connection between how much you overstep 
the quota and whether you got monitored. 
Monitoring is connected to the amount I log. 
I got caught when I only overstepped by 1 and didn’t get caught when I 
overstepped by 60. That didn’t make sense to me. 
Random 
monitoring 
But I thought it was random, so there was no point in cheating. 
I thought that monitoring was done randomly. 
No consecutive 
monitoring 
I thought that I wouldn’t get checked twice in a row.   
I didn’t think the police monitored in 2 consecutive rounds. 
Initially I didn’t think I would get monitored 2 times in a row 
Certain 
monitoring 
I thought that the chances of getting caught are really high, almost 
certain. 
Effect of illegal 
logging on 
demand 
I was wondering whether logging more than the quota had some effect 
on the demand. 
I wondered if rising demand is connected to the fact that I got caught. 
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Appendix 11: Coding according to clusters 
To begin with, the clusters were created by inductively coding the qualitative data. I looked at 
the data of each participant as a whole, and then focused on the paraphrased example for 
classifying each participant into a cluster. The same procedure was undertaken for coding the 
data according to reasoning variables (see Table 15). Namely, I scanned each participant’s data 
holistically and then scrutinized the paraphrased example to determine the main variable the 
participant used while reasoning about their behavior. The results of this coding procedure are 
described in Chapter 7. 
 
Cluster Reasoning variable Paraphrased example 
Competitive 
noncompliant 
Score I wanted to earn points and the way to do that was to cheat. At 
first, I was going by the book in order to learn the mechanics of 
the game. Then, I was focused on earning points. My strategy 
was like that in poker. The only way you can win is by 
bluffing. The reason I chose this strategy was because I knew I 
was competing with someone. If it had been only me, then I 
would have probably just complied all the time. 
At the beginning I just wanted to stick with the quota. Then I 
just wanted to risk it and see if they would really catch me. I 
got competitive, but I was still quite risk averse. Once I got 
‘enough points’ I resisted the temptation to cheat from the 
increasing gap.   
Anticipation of 
monitoring 
At first, I followed the rules in order to get a sense of the 
frequency of monitoring. But after not getting inspected in the 
first round I got eager and tried to cheat. Getting sanctioned 
twice brought me to a cautious state of mind. You can say that 
my main strategy driver was trying to guess when monitoring 
took place. 
I wanted to win but I didn’t want to get caught. I was mostly 
motivated by the sanction. At the beginning I complied in order 
to avoid getting caught. Then I started risking it logging more 
each round. But then I got sanctioned which made me decrease 
my logging level little by little again. 
I first started logging legally and then I tried to log illegally 
sometimes to see if I would get fined. Overall, I wanted to keep 
my score positive and get enough points. 
Competitive 
compliant 
Score I followed the legal allowance and only tried to go over the 
quota once by little (10m3) because I wanted to see what would 
happen if I gambled. The winning mentality made me follow 
the rules. I wanted to win, and I didn’t know what the other 
player was doing (Winning is getting more points than the 
opponent), but something in me told me to follow the rules. 
I tried to stay as close to the legal quota as possible because I 
knew the demand would be higher anyway. I thought that if I 
went by the quota all of the time that that would eventually 
even out if I risk it and lose a few times. The reason behind this 
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strategy is because I am not a gambling person and consider 
myself unlucky. 
I wanted to abide by the quota because I thought that that was 
going to get me the most points. I’m always for the less risky 
investments. My motivation was to make profit while 
preserving the land. It’s an important issue. 
My plan was to stay in the positive range by abiding by the 
quota in the beginning and then log less to spare the forest. 
Sanction avoidance I was really paranoid about getting caught. I am not a risk taker 
by nature. I adopted a conservative strategy. My strategy was 
focused on occasionally point grabbing, but ultimately mostly 
driven by punishment avoidance. I chose it because I am a 
coward. 
Seeing others get 
sanctioned 
I started with lower than the quota just to see if the forest cover 
would increase and to understand the mechanics in the game. I 
wanted to win the game by beating others as opposed to 
maximizing my points. My biggest motivation was seeing 
others lose. My strategy was low risk and I was counting on 





In the first year I was obeying the rules until I got upset when 
the quota fell, and demand rose. So, emotion drove my decision 
to switch my strategy. Then, I tried to figure out how frequently 
there was inspection and tried to cheat as much as I can, to get 
a bigger payoff. 
I tried to get away with what I could in order to satisfy the 
demand. My decisions were based on gut instinct. I felt like 
people were waiting for me to provide. Out of all things my 
decisions were most influenced by getting sanctioned. My 
strategy was 50% gut instinct and 50% being careful. 
I started complying with the quota in order to see how the game 
worked. But then I thought I needed more. However, getting 
sanctioned made me comply. I was scared to log the full 
demand (more than 10 above the quota). Overall, I wanted to 
satisfy the people. I was really scared and risk averse. In my 
reflection I realized that I would have been better off just 
complying with the quota. 
I started gambling immediately to get a sense of the 
mechanism. My strategy was quite reactive. Getting caught 
made me comply. Not getting caught made me cheat. My main 
motivation was to meet the demand and get points. 
My strategy was to log the full demand in the middle of the 
game because I believed that monitoring is connected to my 
logging level. The goal was to satisfy the demand using the 
greedy approach. My personality was my motivation. 
Noncompetitive 
compliant 
Sanction avoidance I abided because if you break the rules all the logs will be taken 
away.  
My strategy was to be safe and abide by the law. I would do 
that in real life and I didn’t want all of the logs to get removed 
by the police. It’s a big penalty, so it’s not worth it.  If I had 
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Forest cover My goal was to keep the forest cover as high as possible. I 
logged as low as possible in order to see if the forest cover 
would increase. But I soon realized that there were other 
loggers. So, I lost hope that it would increase. So, I just shifted 
my expectation to slow down the rate at which the forest cover 
decreases. I switched my strategy because the forest cover 
dropped and the fact that there were only 3 trees left out of 10. 
Demand I started complying with the quota in order to see how the game 
worked. But then I thought I needed more. However, getting 
sanctioned made me comply. I was scared to log the full 
demand (more than 10 above the quota). Overall, I wanted to 
satisfy the people. I was really scared and risk averse. In my 
reflection I realized that I would have been better off just 
complying with the quota. 
Table 15. Coding according to clusters 
